This paper investigates whether investor-level taxes affect corporate payout policy decisions. We predict and find a surge of special dividends in the final months of 2010 and 2012, immediately before individual-level dividend tax rates were expected to increase. We also find evidence that immediately before the expected tax increases, firms altered the timing of their regular dividend payments by shifting what would normally be January regular dividend payments into the preceding December. To our knowledge this is the first evidence in the literature about changes in the timing of regular dividend payments in response to tax law changes. For both actions (specials and shifting), we find that it was more likely for a firm to respond to individual-level tax rates if insiders owned a relatively large amount of the firm. Overall, our paper provides evidence that managers consider individual-level taxes in making corporate payout decisions.

Cryptocurrency has been the subject of heightened regulatory and investor attention in recent years, and regulators and policymakers across the globe are deliberating on how to account for, regulate, tax, and oversee digital assets and cryptocurrency marketplaces. Yet researchers have a limited understanding of key attributes of those who deal in crypto assets, such as whether their financial sophistication differs from that of other investors. Using U.S. administrative data, we provide evidence on (i) the attributes of taxpayers reporting cryptocurrency sales to the IRS, (ii) how these attributes are evolving, and (iii) how investors treat cryptocurrency versus other financial assets in certain settings. The results suggest that average reporting cryptocurrency sellers exhibit demographic attributes generally associated with less financial sophistication and are more likely to trade in meme stocks. Overall, we provide timely evidence that can inform cryptocurrency policy deliberations by highlighting the characteristics of taxpayers who appear to report cryptocurrency sales.

Tax audits are a necessary component of the tax system, but policymakers and others have expressed concerns about their potentially adverse real effects. Understanding the causal effects of tax audits has been hampered by lack of data and because typically tax audits are not randomly assigned. We use administrative data from random tax audits of small businesses to examine the real effects of being subject to a tax audit. We find that audited firms are more likely to go out of business following the audit. The effect is concentrated in firms that underreport their taxes, although we find some evidence that the administrative costs of an audit also negatively affect firm survival. Among firms that continue as going concerns, we find evidence that audits have adverse effects on future revenues but no effect on future wages, employment, or investment. Finally, we find that tax audits have side benefits, causing firms to make changes to improve their tax efficiency.

We study how public and private disclosure requirements interact to influence both tax regulator enforcement and firm disclosure. To capture IRS enforcement activities, we introduce a novel data set of IRS acquisition of firms’ public financial disclosures, which we label IRS attention. We examine the implementation of two new disclosure requirements that potentially alter IRS attention: FIN 48, which increased public tax disclosure requirements, and Schedule UTP, which increased private tax disclosure. We find that IRS attention increased following FIN 48 but subsequently decreased following Schedule UTP, consistent with public and private disclosure interacting to influence tax enforcement. We next examine how private tax disclosure requirements under Schedule UTP affected firms’ public disclosure responses. We find that, following Schedule UTP, firms significantly increased the quantity and altered the content of their tax-related disclosures, consistent with lower tax-related proprietary costs of disclosure. Our results suggest that changes in SEC disclosure requirements altered the IRS's behavior with regard to public information acquisition, and, relatedly, changes in IRS private disclosure requirements appear to change firms’ public disclosure behavior.

We quantify the immediate net effect of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) on the tax burden of corporate profits for public US corporations. We find similar reductions in effective tax rates for domestic and multinational firms, yet the entirety of multinational tax savings stemmed from tax savings on their domestic, not foreign, earnings. We find no significant change in the federal tax burden on foreign earnings neither on average norspecifically for firms most likely to be subject to new anti‐abuse provisions. We find some evidence that firms not targeted by anti‐abuse provisions saw reductions in their federal tax burden on foreign income. Overall, while the tax burden on domestic income decreased significantly, our findings suggest the tax burden on the foreign earnings of US multinationals is largely unaffected despite the overhaul of the international tax system. Importantly for US multinationals' investment decisions, while foreign income was heavily tax‐favored prior to tax reform, we find that foreign and domestic incomes are similarly taxed after TCJA enactment.

Drawing on confidential Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data, we examine whether privately held corporations are more aggressive tax planners than their publicly held peers. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find no consistent evidence that private firms are more aggressive tax planners. We then examine whether private firms’ tax planning differs from that of public firms more generally. We find that private firms engage in more conforming tax planning (planning that also reduces pretax accounting income). However, tests of nonconforming tax planning reveal that private firms generally engage in the same or less planning relative to their public peers. Overall, our findings cast doubt on the belief that private firms are generally more aggressive tax planners than are public firms, but confirm that they engage in more of some forms of general (i.e., conforming) planning. Data Availability: The IRS provided confidential tax information to Michele S. Mullaney pursuant to an Intragovernmental Personnel Act of 1970 (IPA) agreement through the Statistics of Income (SOI) Joint Statistical Research Program (JSRP).