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Ownership Structure, Business Group Affiliation, Listing Status, and Earnings Management: Evidence from Korea*
Using a large sample of both publicly traded and privately held firms in South Korea (hereafter “Korea”), we investigate whether, and how, the deviation of controlling shareholders' control from ownership, business group affiliation, and listing status differentially affect the extent of earnings management. Our study yields three major findings. First, we find that as the control‐ownership disparity becomes larger, controlling shareholders tend to engage more in opportunistic earnings management to hide their behavior and avoid adverse consequences such as disciplinary action. The result of our full‐model regression reveals that an increase in the control‐ownership wedge by 1 percent leads to an increase in the magnitude of (unsigned) discretionary accruals by 1.3 percent of lagged total assets, ceteris paribus. Second, we find that for our full‐model regression, the magnitude of (unsigned) discretionary accruals is greater for group‐affiliated firms than for nonaffiliated firms by 0.8 percent of lagged total assets. This result suggests that business group affiliation provides controlling shareholders with more incentives and opportunities for earnings management. Finally, we find that for our full‐model regression, the magnitude of (unsigned) discretionary accruals is greater for publicly traded firms than for privately held firms by 1.2 percent of lagged total assets. This result supports the notion that stock markets create incentives for public firms to manage reported earnings to satisfy the expectations of various market participants that are often expressed in earnings numbers.
Do Firm‐Specific Stock Price Crashes Lead to a Stimulation or Distortion of Market Information Efficiency?*
Unlike prior research that focuses on determinants of firm-specific stock price crashes (SPCs), we study the consequences of SPCs on market information efficiency. The tension underlying our research question stems from two competing explanations. As an unanticipated shock, an SPC could stimulate (distort) information efficiency by triggering investor rational attention (opinion divergence). Our identification strategy involves a difference-in-differences analysis in which SPC firms in the treatment sample are propensity score matched with non-SPC firms in the industry-peer control sample, as well as placebo tests for falsification. Consistent with the stimulation effect, we find an increase of the earnings response coefficient and a decrease in post-earnings announcement drift, from the pre- to post-SPC period, for SPC firms, but not for non-SPC firms. Further analyses reveal that SPC firms attract increased investor attention, as reflected in greater analyst coverage and more investor access to firms' online financial filings following such an event. Using mutual fund flow redemption pressure based on hypothetical sales as an exogenous shock to SPCs, we provide evidence corroborating our causal interpretation of the main findings. Collectively, the evidence suggests that SPCs can attract increased investor attention, bringing about positive externalities by stimulating market information efficiency.
The voluntary adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards and loan contracting around the world
Ownership concentration, foreign shareholding, audit quality, and stock price synchronicity: Evidence from China
This paper investigates the effects of largest-shareholder ownership concentration, foreign ownership, and audit quality on the amount of firm-specific information incorporated into share prices, as measured by stock price synchronicity, of Chinese-listed firms over the 1996–2003 period. We show that synchronicity is a concave function of ownership by the largest shareholder with its maximum at an approximate 50% level. Further, we find that synchronicity is higher when the largest shareholder is government related. We also find that foreign ownership and auditor quality are inversely associated with synchronicity. Finally, we show that the amount of earnings information reflected in stock returns is lower for firms with high synchronicity.
Does credit default swap trading improve managerial learning from outsiders?
We investigate whether credit default swap (CDS) trading results in managers learning new information through stock prices that is relevant to their investment and forecasting decisions. We argue that the CDS market structure, the sophistication of CDS market participants, and the cleanness of CDS spreads as a signal of default risk together produce and convey information that is new to managers of firms referenced in CDS contracts. We consider two measures for managerial learning: (1) the sensitivity of managerial investments to share prices and (2) the sensitivity of changes in management forecast accuracy to stock returns. We find that both sensitivity measures increase significantly when firms are referenced in any traded CDS contracts, indicating that CDS trading improves managerial learning. We also find that the improvement in managerial learning is more pronounced for firms that are subject to higher uncertainty in industry‐specific and economy‐wide prospects, consistent with the view that CDS market participants have informational advantages with respect to the industry‐level and macroeconomic environments. We further find that the improvement in managerial learning is more evident for firms with higher credit risk. Our findings provide large‐sample evidence on a positive consequence of CDS trading in the context of managers' ability to learn from outside investors.
Corporate tax avoidance and stock price crash risk: Firm-level analysis
Using a large sample of U.S. firms for the period 1995–2008, we provide strong and robust evidence that corporate tax avoidance is positively associated with firm-specific stock price crash risk. This finding is consistent with the following view: Tax avoidance facilitates managerial rent extraction and bad news hoarding activities for extended periods by providing tools, masks, and justifications for these opportunistic behaviors. The hoarding and accumulation of bad news for extended periods lead to stock price crashes when the accumulated hidden bad news crosses a tipping point, and thus comes out all at once. Moreover, we show that the positive relation between tax avoidance and crash risk is attenuated when firms have strong external monitoring mechanisms such as high institutional ownership, high analyst coverage, and greater takeover threat from corporate control markets.
CFOs versus CEOs: Equity incentives and crashes
Using a large sample of U.S. firms for the period 1993–2009, we provide evidence that the sensitivity of a chief financial officer's (CFO) option portfolio value to stock price is significantly and positively related to the firm's future stock price crash risk. In contrast, we find only weak evidence of the positive impact of chief executive officer option sensitivity on crash risk. Finally, we find that the link between CFO option sensitivity and crash risk is more pronounced for firms in non-competitive industries and those with a high level of financial leverage.
Collusive versus coercive corporate corruption: evidence from demand-side shocks and supply-side disclosures
Internal Control Weakness and Bank Loan Contracting: Evidence from SOX Section 404 Disclosures
Using a sample of borrowing firms that disclosed internal control weaknesses (ICW) under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, this study compares various features of loan contracts between firms with ICW and those without ICW. Our results show the following. First, the loan spread is higher for ICW firms than for non-ICW firms by about 28 basis points, after controlling for other known determinants of loan contract terms. Second, firms with more severe, company-level ICW pay significantly higher loan rates than those with less severe, account-level ICW. Third, lenders impose tighter nonprice terms on firms with ICW than on those without ICW. Fourth, fewer lenders are attracted to loan contracts involving firms with ICW. Finally, our within-firm analyses show that banks increase loan rates charged to ICW firms after their disclosure of internal control problems and that banks reduce loan rates after firms remediate previously reported ICW.