ABSTRACT In deciding how much information about their firms’ customers to disclose, managers face a trade off between the benefits of reducing information asymmetry with capital market participants and the costs of aiding competitors by revealing proprietary information. This paper investigates the determinants of managers’ choices to disclose information about their firms’ customers using a comprehensive data set of customer‐information disclosures over the period 1976–2006. We find robust evidence in support of the hypothesis that proprietary costs are an important factor in firms’ disclosure choices regarding information about large customers.

Abstract The growing popularity of home-sharing platforms such as Airbnb, partly fueled by hosts’ ability to evade local taxes and regulations, has been shown to elevate housing costs by reallocating long-term housing units to the short-term rental market. This study assesses whether enhanced tax enforcement can mitigate this trend. We analyze staggered tax collection agreements between Airbnb and Florida counties, wherein Airbnb collects taxes from the hosts directly. Using a difference-in-differences methodology, we find these agreements significantly slow the growth of housing costs, highlighting the importance of tax policy in addressing the sharing economy’s influence on housing affordability.