Maternal and neonatal mortality rates in the slums of Nairobi, Kenya are among the highest in the world. Mounting evidence suggests that delivering in a facility is not enough to ensure mortality reductions: women must deliver in high-quality facilities and arrive early enough for appropriate care if complications arise. We designed an RCT combining labeled cash transfers and pre-commitment incentives to encourage earlier and more effective delivery facility choice and to promote earlier facility arrival. We find that the intervention improves planning, increases delivery at the desired facility, and encourages more timely arrival at delivery facilities.

Both under- and over-treatment of communicable diseases are public bads. But efforts to decrease one run the risk of increasing the other. Using rich experimental data on household treatment-seeking behavior in Kenya, we study the implications of this trade-off for subsidizing life-saving antimalarials sold over-the-counter at retail drug outlets. We show that a very high subsidy (such as the one under consideration by the international community) dramatically increases access, but nearly one-half of subsidized pills go to patients without malaria. We study two ways to better target subsidized drugs: reducing the subsidy level, and introducing rapid malaria tests over-the-counter.