This article examines whether and how stock mispricing can affect the probability of CEO turnover. In a sample of 1,573 US public firms, I find that, after controlling for fundamental performance, a 1-standard-deviation negative uninformative stock price shock increases the likelihood of CEO turnover by 10%. The mispricing-turnover sensitivity is stronger at firms with an independent board, and a difference-in-difference analysis further supports that finding. Ancillary results suggest that independent directors’ career concerns may play a role in the response of independent boards to mispricing.

This paper demonstrates, theoretically and empirically, that firms’ research and development (R&D) efforts and investors’ analyses of their prospects are mutually reinforcing. Entrepreneurs attempt more research when financiers are better informed about projects’ profitability because they expect financiers to provide more funding to successful projects. Conversely, financiers collect more information about projects when entrepreneurs undertake more R&D because the opportunity cost of missing out on successful projects is then higher. Two natural experiments confirm that this interaction occurs and suggest that it contributes to about one third of the total effect of a policy designed to stimulate R&D. Overall, the analysis suggests that policies aimed at promoting R&D – such as research subsidies or tax breaks – have a multiplier effect owing to the induced improvement in capital efficiency. As a result, those policies can be rendered more effective by coupling them with other policies designed to increase capital efficiency. The feedback effect that we document also helps explaining why innovative ecosystems such as that in the Silicon Valley are challenging to set up.

Using two decades of French administrative data, we find that post‐leveraged buyout (LBO), target firms reduce within‐firm pay gaps while increasing profitability relative to control firms. Employee turnover drives the pay‐gap reduction. In target and control firms alike, turnovers reduce average pay more at the top of the wage distribution than at the bottom because separated employees are paid more—new joiners less—than similar employees, especially among skilled employees. LBOs amplify this effect through increased turnover among managers. Post‐buyout, p90/p10, gender, age, and managers/non‐managers pay gaps decline by 3%, 9%, 21%, and 4% and the employee pool becomes younger.