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Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation

Econometrica 2006 74(4), 1063-1107 open access
A contract with multiple agents may be susceptible to collusion. We show that agents' collusion imposes no cost in a large class of circumstances with risk neutral agents, including both uncorrelated and correlated types. In those circumstances, any payoff the principal can attain in the absence of collusion, including the second best level, can be attained in the presence of collusion in a way robust to many aspects of collusion behavior. The collusion-proof implementation generalizes to a setting in which only a subset of agents may collude, provided that noncollusive agents' incentives can be protected via an ex post incentive compatible and ex post individually rational mechanism. Our collusion-proof implementation also sheds light on the extent to which hierarchical delegation of contracts can optimally respond to collusion.

Generalized Reduced-Form Auctions: A Network-Flow Approach

Econometrica 2013 81(6), 2487-2520 open access
We develop a network-flow approach for characterizing interim-allocation rules that can be implemented by ex post allocations. Our method can be used to characterize feasible interim allocations in general multi-unit auctions where agents face capacity constraints, both ceilings and floors. Applications include a variety of settings of practical interest, ranging from individual and group-specific capacity constraints, set-aside sale, partnership dissolution, and government license reallocation.

“Near” Weighted Utilitarian Characterizations of Pareto Optima

Econometrica 2024 92(1), 141-165 open access
We give two characterizations of Pareto optimality via “near” weighted utilitarian welfare maximization. One characterization sequentially maximizes utilitarian welfare functions using a finite sequence of nonnegative and eventually positive welfare weights. The other maximizes a utilitarian welfare function with a certain class of positive hyperreal weights. The social welfare ordering represented by these “near” weighted utilitarian welfare criteria is characterized by the standard axioms for weighted utilitarianism under a suitable weakening of the continuity axiom.