We examine the consequences of corporate tax enforcement for business activity. Using two different empirical approaches—a regional design and a firm-level design—we document that corporate tax enforcement is negatively associated with business activity, as measured by establishments and employment. This association is economically significant and is robust to tests that mitigate concerns regarding endogeneity and measurement. Furthermore, we find that the negative association between tax enforcement and business activity varies substantially in the cross-section. Specifically, we find that it is weaker for regions and firms with greater access to external financing sources and is stronger for regions and firms where compliance costs are likely higher and for which the ex ante costs of tax enforcement are greater. Our findings suggest that the effects of tax enforcement on business activity are economically important and heterogeneous, which should be of interest to academics and policymakers.

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena in a perfectly competitive, general equilibrium framework. Perfect competition eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates. It also makes for a simple equilibrium refinement, which we propose in order to rule out irrational pessimism about deliveries of untraded assets. We show that refined equilibrium always exists in our model, and that default, in conjunction with refinement, opens the door to a theory of endogenous assets. The market chooses the promises, default penalties, and quantity constraints of actively traded assets.