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A Comment on:“Walras–Bowley Lecture: Market Power and Wage Inequality” by Shubhdeep Deb, Jan Eeckhout, Aseem Patel, and Lawrence Warren

Econometrica 2024 92(3), 643-646 open access
A burgeoning literature in labor economics is focused on modeling employer labor market power, generally finding nontrivial estimates of monopsony power. A smaller literature also simultaneously incorporates product market power. Deb, Eeckhout, Patel, and Warren (2024) is an example of applying an oligopoly‐oligopsony model to the U.S. labor market, arguing for important effects on wage levels and inequality from rising market power. I support combining IO and labor as a fruitful way of studying wages and business dynamism, but argue for looking more broadly at (i) differential degrees of employer power in labor and product markets; (ii) investigating the dynamic sources of markups (e.g., through innovation), and (iii) considering wage bargaining models, not just wage posting models, which have some starkly different implications for wage setting.

Firm Size Distortions and the Productivity Distribution: Evidence from France

American Economic Review 2016 106(11), 3439-3479 open access
We show how size-contingent laws can be used to identify the equilibrium and welfare effects of labor regulation. Our framework incorporates such regulations into the Lucas (1978) model and applies this to France where many labor laws start to bind on firms with exactly 50 or more employees. Using data on the population of firms between 2002 and 2007 period, we structurally estimate the key parameters of our model to construct counterfactual size, productivity and welfare distributions. With flexible wages, the deadweight loss of the regulation is below 1% of GDP, but when wages are downwardly rigid welfare losses exceed 5%. We also show, regardless of wage flexibility, that the main losers from the regulation are workers (and to a lesser extent large firms) and the main winners are small firms.

New Approaches to Surveying Organizations

American Economic Review 2010 100(2), 105-109 open access
The last three decades have witnessed an explosion of theoretical work on the organization of firms (Robert Gibbons and John Roberts forthcoming). In parallel, there has been a massive increase in access to microdata which has revealed huge dispersions in productivity. For example, within narrow industries like cement, oak flooring, and block-ice the total factor productivity of plants at the ninetieth percentile is about twice that of those at the tenth percentile (Lucia Foster, John Haltiwanger, and Chad Syversson 2008). Unfortunately, analyzing to what extent this heterogeneity in productivity is due to management and organizational practices, unmeasured inputs, or other technologies has been held back by a lack of data. National statistical agencies do not usually collect data on the internal organization of companies, nor do firms report this in their accounts. Recently, however, social scientists have been starting to fill this gap by working closely with small numbers of individual firms (e.g., the “Insider Econometrics” approach described in Kathryn Shaw 2009) or covering wide cross-sections of firms (e.g., Nicholas Bloom, Raffaella Sadun, and John Van Reenen 2009). In this paper we describe some of the tools of this research, particularly Bloom and Van Reenen (2007)—henceforth BVR— for measuring management and organizational practices. 1

Has ICT Polarized Skill Demand? Evidence from Eleven Countries over Twenty-Five Years

The Review of Economics and Statistics 2014 96(1), 60-77 open access
We test the hypothesis that information and communication technologies (ICT) polarize labor markets by increasing demand for the highly educated at the expense of the middle educated, with little effect on low-educated workers. Using data on the United States, Japan, and nine European countries from 1980 to 2004, we find that industries with faster ICT growth shifted demand from middle-educated workers to highly educated workers, consistent with ICT-based polarization. Trade openness is also associated with polarization, but this is not robust to controlling for R&D. Technologies account for up to a quarter of the growth in demand for highly educated workers.

How Special Is the Special Relationship? Using the Impact of U.S. R&D Spillovers on U.K. Firms as a Test of Technology Sourcing

American Economic Review 2006 96(5), 1859-1875 open access
We examine the “technology sourcing” hypothesis that foreign research labs located in the U.S. tap into U.S. R&D spillovers and improve home country productivity. We show that U.K. firms that established a high proportion of inventors based in the U.S. by 1990 benefited disproportionately from the growth of U.S. R&D stock over the next ten years. We estimate that U.S. R&D during the 1990s was associated with 5 percent higher Total Factor Productivity for U.K. manufacturing firms in 2000 (about $13 billion), with the majority of benefits accruing to firms with an innovative presence in the U.S.

The Organization of Firms Across Countries*

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2012 127(4), 1663-1705 open access
We argue that social capital as proxied by trust increases aggregate productivity by affecting the organization of firms. To do this we collect new data on the decentralization of investment, hiring, production, and sales decisions from corporate headquarters to local plant managers in almost 4,000 firms in the United States, Europe, and Asia. We find that firms headquartered in high-trust regions are significantly more likely to decentralize. To help identify causal effects, we look within multinational firms and show that higher levels of bilateral trust between the multinational’s country of origin and subsidiary’s country of location increases decentralization, even after instrumenting trust using religious similarities between the countries. Finally, we show evidence suggesting that trust raises aggregate productivity by facilitating reallocation between firms and allowing more efficient firms to grow, as CEOs can decentralize more decisions.

Identifying Technology Spillovers and Product Market Rivalry

Econometrica 2013 81(4), 1347-1393 open access
The impact of R&D on growth through spillovers has been a major topic of economic research over the last thirty years. A central problem in the literature is that firm performance is affected by two countervailing “spillovers” : a positive effect from technology (knowledge) spillovers and a negative business stealing effects from product market rivals. We develop a general framework incorporating these two types of spillovers and implement this model using measures of a firm's position in technology space and productmarket space. Using panel data on U.S. firms, we show that technology spillovers quantitatively dominate, so that the gross social returns to R&D are at least twice as high as the private returns. We identify the causal effect of R&D spillovers by using changes in federal and state tax incentives for R&D. We also find that smaller firms generate lower social returns to R&D because they operate more in technological niches. Finally, we detail the desirable properties of an ideal spillover measure and how existing approaches, including our new Mahalanobis measure, compare to these criteria.

The Intellectual Spoils of War? Defense R&D, Productivity, and International Spillovers

The Review of Economics and Statistics 2025 107(1), 14-27 open access
We examine the impact of government funding for R&D—and defense-related R&D in particular—on privately conducted R&D and its ultimate effect on productivity growth. We estimate longitudinal models that relate privately funded R&D to lagged government-funded R&D using industry-country level data from OECD countries and firm level data from France. To deal with the potentially endogenous allocation of government R&D funds, we use changes in predicted defense R&D as an instrumental variable. In many OECD countries, expenditures for defense-related R&D represent by far the most important form of public subsidies for innovation. In both datasets, we uncover evidence of “crowding in” rather than “crowding out,” as increases in government-funded R&D for an industry or a firm result in significant increases in private sector R&D in that industry or firm. On average, a 10% increase in government-financed R&D generates a 5% to 6% additional increase in privately funded R&D. We also find evidence of international spillovers, as increases in government-funded R&D in a particular industry and country raise private R&D in the same industry in other countries. Finally, we find that increases in private R&D induced by increases in defense R&D result in productivity gains.

Opening Up Military Innovation: Causal Effects of Reforms to US Defense Research

Journal of Political Economy 2025 133(11), 3605-3651 open access
For governments procuring innovation, one choice is whether to specify desired products (a "Conventional" approach) or allow firms to suggest ideas (an "Open" approach). Using a U.S. Air Force R&D grant program, where Open and Conventional competitions were held simultaneously, we find that Open awards increase both commercial innovation and technology adoption by the military. In contrast, Conventional awards have no positive technology effects, but do create more program lock-in. The Open program attracts new types of applicants (e.g. start-ups), but openness also has a differential impact beyond inducing selection. These results suggest benefits from open approaches to innovation procurement.

The Impact of Regulation on Innovation

American Economic Review 2023 113(11), 2894-2936 open access
Does regulation affect the pace and nature of innovation and if so, by how much? We build a tractable and quantifiable endogenous growth model with size-contingent regulations. We apply this to population administrative firm panel data from France, where many labor regulations apply to firms with 50 or more employees. Nonparametrically, we find that there is a sharp fall in the fraction of innovating firms just to the left of the regulatory threshold. Further, a dynamic analysis shows a sharp reduction in the firm’s innovation response to exogenous demand shocks for firms just below the regulatory threshold. We then quantitatively fit the parameters of the model to the data, finding that innovation at the macro level is about 5.4% lower due to the regulation, a 2.2% consumption equivalent welfare loss. Four-fifths of this loss is due to lower innovation intensity per firm rather than just a misallocation towards smaller firms and lower entry. We generalize the theory to allow for changes in the direction of R&D, and find that regulation’s negative effects only matter for incremental innovation (as measured by citations and text-based measures of novelty). A more regulated economy may have less innovation, but when firms do innovate they tend to “swing for the fence” with more radical (and labor saving) breakthroughs.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.