We propose and test a theory of using commodities as collateral for financing. Under capital control and collateral constraint, investors import commodities and pledge them as collateral to earn higher expected returns. Higher collateral demands increase commodity prices and make the inventory–convenience yield relation less negative. Our model illustrates these equilibrium effects and suggests that the violation of covered interest-rate parity is a proxy for collateral demands. Evidence from eight commodities in China and developed markets supports the theoretical predictions. Our findings complement the theory of storage and provide new insights into the financialization of commodity markets. Received July 16, 2015; accepted April 7, 2016 by Editor Stefan Nagel.

One distinguishable feature of storable commodities is that they relate to two markets: cash market and storage market. This paper proves that, if no arbitrage exists in the storage-cash dual markets, the commodity convenience yield has to be non-negative. However, classical reduced-form models for futures term structures could allow serious arbitrages due to the high volatility of the convenience yield. To avoid negative convenience yield, this paper proposes a semi-affine arbitrage-free model, which prices futures analytically and fits futures term structures reasonably well. Importantly, our model prices commodity-related contingent claims (such as calendar spread options) quite differently with classical models.

This paper shows that economic linkages among commodities create a source of long-term correlation between futures returns. We extend the theory of storage to a multi-commodity level and find that the convenience yield of a commodity depends on its relative scarcity with respect to other related commodities. This implies a feedback effect between commodities that is necessary to replicate the upward-sloping correlation term structure of futures returns observed for related commodities. We present a multi-commodity affine model that validates our theoretical predictions and considerably reduces the pricing errors in out-of-sample crack spread options.

ABSTRACT We use proprietary data on intraday transactions at a futures brokerage to analyze how implied leverage influences trading performance. Across all investors, leverage is negatively related to performance, due partly to increased trading costs and partly to forced liquidations resulting from margin calls. Defining skill out‐of‐sample, we find that relative performance differentials across unskilled and skilled investors persist. Unskilled investors' leverage amplifies losses from lottery preferences and the disposition effect. Leverage stimulates liquidity provision by skilled investors, and enhances returns. Although regulatory increases in required margins decrease skilled investors' returns, they enhance overall returns, and attenuate return volatility.