This paper investigates the use of exit consents in a sample of bond exchange offers during 1986–1997. We find that exit consents are common, approximately 56% of the exchange offers in our sample have them and 60% of the exit consents are by non-financially distressed firms. Using a probit model, we find that a set of variables that proxy for holdout problems is able to significantly explain the use of exit consents. Reducing holdouts is necessary for timely and efficient debt restructurings and achieving financial stability particularly in sovereign debt markets.

This paper presents empirical analysis of the factors that affect a firm's decision to use a clawback provision in debt and the yield impact of including the clawback provision. The results show that relatively smaller firms with low credit rating and low profitability favor the usage of clawback provisions. We also find that debt with clawback provisions have the highest yield spread followed by callable bonds and straight debt. Convertible bonds that offer investors the option to convert to equity have lower yield spread. This implies that issuers can trade off flexibility for higher interest cost and that the clawback feature may be a significant financial innovation which reduces information asymmetry and creates an entry point for small firms to gain access to the public bond markets.