Over the past decade, the audit profession has significantly increased its use of non‐equity partners for private (non‐listed) company audits. Such partners lead audit engagements and sign audit reports but do not share in the partnership's profits. Non‐equity partner positions were introduced in response to increasing workloads and to retain talented individuals unsuited to or uninterested in equity partnership, either temporarily or permanently. Using data from Big 4 private company audits during the period 2008–2017, our analyses show that equity incentives affect auditors' reporting behavior and their clients' financial reporting quality. Non‐equity partners are less likely to issue going‐concern opinions to their financially distressed clients, their reporting is less accurate (i.e., more Type II errors), their reporting is less conservative, and their clients' financial reporting is of lower quality (i.e., more frequent reporting of small earnings increases and more tax restatements). We also find that equity incentives mitigate some of the negative effects of fee‐based compensation on auditors' reporting behavior. Moreover, our findings suggest that incentives arising from ownership, rather than partners' innate differences or client differences, drive these associations.

Prior research finds that women receive lower salaries than men. Similarly, we show that female audit partners in Belgium receive significantly lower compensation than male partners. However, there are alternative explanations for the pay gap other than gender discrimination. For example, the gap in compensation could reflect that men are paid more because they have higher levels of productivity. We provide new predictions and tests of gender discrimination by comparing the fees generated by audit partners (a measure of partner productivity) and the types of clients assigned to partners. Consistent with our prediction of female partners having to meet higher performance thresholds than male partners, we show that female partners generate larger fee premiums, but they are less likely to be assigned to prestigious clients. To test whether these patterns are attributable to gender discrimination, we examine whether the results are stronger in male‐dominated offices, because this is where we would expect to find the most discrimination against women. We find the fee premiums generated by female partners are larger in male‐dominated offices, while the negative association between prestigious clients and female partners is stronger in male‐dominated offices. Collectively, our combined predictions and tests are consistent with female partners facing gender discrimination in audit offices that are dominated by male partners.