Abstract. This study establishes and tests, within the framework of a noisy rational expectations equilibrium model, the existence of a formal linear relationship between security prices, the average (consensus) and the dispersion of agents' expectations. Variations in the average and in the dispersion of agents' expectations, measured by the earnings forecasts produced by financial analysts, which are gathered and made available by The Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) , have respectively a positive and negative effect on security prices. The difficulties raised by this estimation, as well as the institutional dimensions of the financial analysis industry are examined. The main results are the following: (1) the most important changes in consensus (in absolute value) correspond to the most important changes in dispersion in the analysts' forecasts, (2) the changes in the consensus and the dispersion of forecasts are respectively positively and negatively linked to Canadian security returns, but given the delay between the production and the public availability of the forecasts, an important part of the price adjustment occurs before the disclosure of forecast changes, (3) the effect on security returns of variations in the consensus dominates the effect of variations in the forecasts' dispersion. Thus, it seems that the impact of information arrival on security prices does not only depend on the direction and the magnitude of the expectations' average revision, but also depends on the direction and the magnitude of the change in the expectations' dispersion.

We examine the relationship between U.S. thrift institution ownership structure and risk taking along with the impact of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) on this relationship. Our results, based on various indicators of risk, suggest that insider controlled thrifts were more likely to engage in risk taking prior to 1989 than were diversely held institutions. FIRREA seems to have curtailed much of this risk taking. We find inverse relationships between risk-taking and levels of institutional shareholdings. This along with other evidence suggests that the motive for risk-taking was not maximization of the ‘option’ value of shares as has been reported elsewhere. We also find evidence that entrenched managers may have generated significant private benefits.

This paper documents the extent to which immigrants participate in the many programs that make up the welfare state. The immigrant-native difference in the probability of receiving cash benefits is small, but the gap widens once other programs are included in the analysis: 21 percent of immigrant households receive some type of assistance, as compared with only 14 percent of native households. The types of benefits received by earlier immigrants influence the types of benefits received by newly arrived immigrants. Hence there might be ethnic networks that transmit information about the availability of particular benefits to new immigrants.

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We analyze the timing, pace, and efficiency of ongoing job reallocation that results from product and process innovation. There are strong reasons why an efficient economy ought to concentrate both job creation and destruction during recessions, when the opportunity cost of reallocation is lowest. Incomplete contracting between labor and capital can disrupt this synchronized pattern and decouple creation and destruction. Transactional difficulties also lead to technological “sclerosis,” characterized by excessively slow renovation. Government incentives to production may alleviate high unemployment but exacerbate sclerosis. In contrast, creation incentives increase the pace of reallocation. An optimal combination of both policies restores economic efficiency.