This article develops the uniform asymptotic theory for local projection (LP) regression when the true lag order of the model is unknown and potentially infinite. The theory allows for varying degrees of persistence in the data, growing response horizons, and general conditionally heteroskedastic martingale-difference shocks. Based on the theory, we make two main contributions. First, we show that LPs can achieve semiparametric efficiency at a given horizon under classical assumptions on the data, provided that the controlled lag order diverges. Thus, the commonly perceived efficiency loss of LPs can become asymptotically negligible with many controls. Second, we propose LP-based inference procedures for (level and cumulated) impulse responses that possess robustness properties not shared by existing methods. Inference methods using two distinct standard errors are considered. The uniform validity for the first method depends on a zero fourth-order cumulant condition on shocks, while that of the second holds more generally for conditionally heteroskedastic martingale-difference shocks. We propose a bootstrap procedure that improves finite-sample performance and extend the standard error construction to structural responses.

Research in finance and macroeconomics has routinely employed multiple horizons to test asset return predictability. In a simple predictive regression model, we find the popular scaled test can have zero power when the predictor is not sufficiently persistent. A new test based on implication of the short-run model is suggested and is shown to be uniformly more powerful than the scaled test. The new test can accommodate multiple predictors. Compared with various other widely used tests, simulation experiments demonstrate remarkable finite-sample performance. We reexamine the predictive ability of various popular predictors for aggregate equity premium.

Using rapid expansion of the Beijing subway from 2000 to 2018, we analyze its impact on collaborative matches in innovations. We find that an hour reduction in travel time between a pair of locations in Beijing brought 14.85% to 37.69% increase in collaborated patents. Far-apart location pairs were more affected, and the local average causal response is approximately 34.92% to 82.29%. The effect is mainly driven by increased matches among highly productive innovators. The entry of new innovators, relocation of existing innovators, and collaborations among low-productive innovators also contribute to the increase in collaborative matches, especially in the long run.

Previous authors have raised the concern that there could be serious survival bias in the observed U.S. equity premium. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we argue that the survival bias in the U.S. data is unlikely to be significant. To reach this conclusion, we introduce a general framework for modeling survival and derive a mathematical relationship between the ex ante survival probability and the average survival bias. This relationship reveals the fundamental difficulty facing the survival argument: High survival bias requires an ex ante probability of market failure, which seems unrealistically high given the history of world financial markets.

We study how firms build relations with local governments in emerging markets without established rules of political lobbying. We document that following a turnover of the Party Secretary or mayor of a city in China, firms (especially privately owned enterprises, POEs hereafter) headquartered in that city significantly increase their “perk spending,” for example, expenses for travel and entertainment among others. Both the instrumental-variable-based results and heterogeneity analysis are consistent with the interpretation that the perk spending is used to build relations with local governments. In addition, we find that local political turnover in a city tends to be followed by changes of the Chairmen or the CEOs of state-owned enterprises that are controlled by the local government. We also discuss and rule out several alternative explanations for the above findings.

We examine shareholder litigation and the price and nonprice terms of bank loan contracts. After filing a lawsuit, defendant firms pay higher loan spreads and up-front charges, experience more financial covenants, and are more likely to have a collateral requirement. These findings are consistent with reputational losses associated with shareholder litigation. The magnitude of a firm’s lost market value when the lawsuit is filed is positively related to the increase in the firm’s future borrowing costs. We investigate whether the lawsuit allegations and its merit affect future bank loan terms. Our results do not appear to be affected by self-selection.

We study a novel mechanism through which real options play a prominent role in inducing the skewness of stock returns. Building on the investment-based asset pricing framework, we show that firms’ real options to contract (expand) their businesses when productivity is low (high) can increase return skewness. Consequently, return skewness represents a U-shaped function of firm productivity. Furthermore, the real-options effect is stronger for more flexible firms, characterized by lower scale-adjustment frictions. Employing a large sample of U.S. firms during 1972–2018, we provide a battery of robust empirical evidence consistent with the model predictions. Our findings demonstrate that firm-level real flexibility can impact investors and managers’ decision making.