In 2021, a social movement rallying retail investors unexpectedly shocked Wall Street, forcing a prominent multi-billion-dollar hedge fund to shut down one year later, after incurring massive financial losses. Social movements in financial markets have significantly developed in the wake of the 2007–09 financial crisis, resulting in the emergence of various collective actions. We analyze one recent example of such action undertaken by the r/WallStreetBets (WSB) community on Reddit, which disrupted the stock prices of several “meme stocks” (e.g., GameStop) by disseminating influential investment narratives. We analyze the 150 most upvoted Due Diligence posts on WSB and interview eight members of its community. We find that a popular expertise in investment narratives emerged, developed, and was propagated on this digital platform. WSB authors' claim to popular expertise is made in a hybrid language combining traditional financial expertise with an accessible and entertaining writing style, complemented by references to pop culture. Our analysis brings out a growing resentment among retail investors about the unfairness of financial markets, and its role in mobilizing them for collective action that challenged the existing order of things. Yet this widespread resentment did not spontaneously translate into a meaningful, sustainable collective action initiative. Our thesis is that the development of popular expertise played an instrumental role in the formation of WSB's collective action initiative targeting several perceived investment opportunities.

ABSTRACT We examine whether the joint provision of corporate social responsibility (CSR) assurance services and financial audit by the same audit firm influences auditors' assessment of going‐concern risk. We predict that the provision of CSR assurance and financial audit by the same audit firm creates CSR‐related knowledge spillovers from the CSR assurance team to the financial audit engagement team, which helps in the auditor's assessment of going‐concern risk. Using more than 28,000 firm‐year observations from 55 countries, we document that, relative to audit firms that provide only the financial audit, audit firms that provide both CSR assurance and financial audit for the same client (i) issue more frequent going‐concern opinions and have lower Type II going‐concern errors, (ii) have clients that book larger environmental and litigation provisions, (iii) report earnings that are more persistent and value‐relevant and are less likely to book income‐decreasing earnings restatements, and (iv) do not charge higher audit fees or total fees. Our results are important especially because of firms' increasing exposure to CSR risks and the growing number of countries that require assurance of CSR reports.