This article shows that publicly available data on buyout fund returns are sufficient to replicate the recent findings derived from superior but proprietary datasets. The average buyout fund outperforms the S&P 500. However, this study shows that buyout funds mainly invest in small and value companies; and the average buyout fund return is similar to that of small-cap indices and that of the oldest small-cap passive mutual fund (“DFA micro-cap”). If the benchmark is changed to small and value indices, and is levered up, the average buyout fund underperforms by 3.1% p.a.

Using a comprehensive survey, we show that investors with a larger capital allocation to private equity are more specialized−measured by the degree to which the investor focuses on private equity rather than other classes of investments−and have a wider scope of due diligence and investment activities. Other investor characteristics (experience, type, location, compensation structure, number of funds under management) play no role. In particular, endowments are not special according to the survey measures. These results are consistent with the changing LP–GP relationship in private equity as capital is increasingly concentrated in the hands of large investors.

The story of Blackstone and Hilton is a defining moment of the private equity industry. This story involves a high stakes leveraged buyout, layoffs, allegations of corporate espionage, the revival of an iconic brand, a $14 billion capital gain, the largest ever in private equity, and the emergence of the largest private market firm. Moreover, this success occurred with a highly-leveraged and cyclical business going through the worst financial crisis since 1933. Somebody deserves a trophy; but who? The answer might be surprising and shows both the difficulty and pertinence of carefully decomposing the sources of value creation in Leveraged Buy-Outs.

Target acquisitiveness stands out as one of the primary drivers of all the key aspects of the market for corporate takeovers: acquisition announcement returns, probability of deal success, propensity to acquire and be acquired. Acquisitive targets, though a small proportion of the sample, are responsible for half of the overall negative acquisition announcement returns. Our large body of empirical evidence consistently supports the view that the motivation behind acquisitions of acquisitive targets is defensive: acquirers “eat in order not to be eaten”.

Private equity has traditionally been thought to provide diversification benefits. However, these benefits may be lower than anticipated as we find that private equity suffers from significant exposure to the same liquidity risk factor as public equity and other alternative asset classes. The unconditional liquidity risk premium is about 3% annually and, in a four‐factor model, the inclusion of this liquidity risk premium reduces alpha to zero. In addition, we provide evidence that the link between private equity returns and overall market liquidity occurs via a funding liquidity channel.

Twelve trillion dollars are allocated to private market funds that require outside investors to commit to transferring capital on demand. We show within a novel dynamic portfolio allocation model that ex‐ante commitment has large effects on investors' portfolios and welfare, and we quantify those effects. Investors are underallocated to private market funds and are willing to pay a larger premium to adjust the quantity committed than to eliminate other frictions, like timing uncertainty and limited tradability. Perhaps counterintuitively, commitment risk premiums increase with secondary market liquidity, and they do not disappear when investments are spread over many funds.

We introduce a methodology to estimate the historical time series of returns to investment in private equity funds. The approach requires only an unbalanced panel of cash contributions and distributions accruing to limited partners and is robust to sparse data. We decompose private equity returns from 1994 to 2015 into a component due to traded factors and a time‐varying private equity premium not spanned by publicly traded factors. We find cyclicality in private equity returns that differs according to fund type and is consistent with the conjecture that capital market segmentation contributes to private equity returns.