Abstract We study human capital synergies in asset management mergers that stem from the improved ability to assign fund managers to more specialized tasks in larger firms. More specialized task assignment allows rotated managers to focus on their investment expertise and leads to incremental $54 million of value added per deal per year on average. The effects are concentrated in mergers that lead to a large increase in firm size and in funds whose management appears less specialized prior to the merger. Our results provide direct evidence on the role of firms in the assignment of tasks to fund managers. (JEL G23, J24, G34)

Does investors’ political ideology shape international capital allocation? We provide evidence from two settings—syndicated corporate loans and equity mutual funds—to show ideological alignment with foreign governments affects the cross-border capital allocation by U.S. institutional investors. Ideological alignment on both economic and social issues plays a role. Our empirical strategy ensures direct economic effects of foreign elections or government ties between countries are not driving the result. Ideological distance between countries also explains variation in bilateral investment. Combined, our findings imply ideological alignment is an important, omitted factor in models of international capital allocation.