While prior work in management accounting has mainly focused on results controls, this study investigates how action accountability as an action control and job autonomy are jointly used by supervisors in a setting in which results controls at the individual employee level are of little relevance. We analyze our research question by collecting survey data among nurses from Swiss public hospitals. We predict and find that when task complexity is high, job autonomy and action accountability are used as substitutes by the supervisor. When task complexity is low, job autonomy and action accountability have a less substitutive relation than when task complexity is high. In supplemental analyses, we also find that action accountability and job autonomy act as substitutes with respect to employee loyalty and effort when task complexity is high and less so when it is low, consistent with supervisors’ control choices. We also collect additional archival and experimental data to provide supplemental evidence for our underlying theory. Our study enhances the understanding of the use and effects of action controls in settings in which results controls at the individual employee level are of little relevance.

This study investigates, via two experiments, the effects of target transparency, which reflects employees' knowledge about each other's targets in an organization, on managers' target setting decisions. We also investigate whether this effect depends on the need for help among employees. We predict and find that target transparency and need for help interact to influence managers' target setting decisions. Target transparency increases target levels when the need for help is low, but not when it is high. Further, target transparency leads managers to differentiate less between individual employee targets. This reduction is greater when the need for help is high than when it is low. Additional analyses support our theory by revealing that managers strategically set targets in a way that is consistent with an intention to motivate both effort at the individual level and help among employees when such are needed. Our results help explain anecdotal evidence of why companies that value help among employees often make targets transparent throughout the entire organization.

Employees’ skill development is key to organizations’ competitiveness in a global, knowledge-based economy. Prior research in accounting, however, has mainly focused on motivating the provision of transitory effort. This study investigates how relative performance information (RPI) as a management control influences employees’ willingness to engage in skill development and whether the effect of RPI depends on whether employees face a tradeoff between training and current work performance. We predict and find that RPI increases the likelihood of taking training when a work-training tradeoff is absent but decreases it when a work-training tradeoff is present. We also predict and find RPI increases employee performance when a work-training tradeoff is absent and the effect is less positive (and directionally negative) when a work-training tradeoff is present. Our paper is an important first step in investigating how management controls interfere with employees’ investment in skill development and its tradeoff with transitory effort provision. Data Availability: Data are available upon request.