This paper examines the corporate investment effect of a time limit on the use of net operating losses (NOLs). We predict that when countries limit the use of NOLs to a few years instead of allowing indefinite use, managers of loss-making firms have an incentive to increase investments to utilize NOLs before they expire. Using exogenous shocks to profitability from two earthquakes in Italy and variation in the tax treatment of NOLs over time, we find support for this prediction: when the use of NOLs is time-restricted, firms facing losses increase investment. Moreover, this effect is more significant for firms with shorter investment horizons and those in more profitable industries. We provide external validity for this finding using a large panel of firms from European Union countries exploiting variation in tax regimes. These results indicate that restricting loss offsets can increase investments of loss-making firms.

We examine how creditor rights affect the trade-off between non-debt and debt tax shields. Using four bankruptcy reforms and a panel of private and public firms from Italy, we show that laws empowering creditors reduce tax avoidance and increase debt financing, consistent with firms substituting non-debt tax shields with debt tax shields. We corroborate the validity of our findings using a panel of public firms across 33 countries. Additionally, we document that the impact of creditor protection laws is mitigated by tax system characteristics, which significantly reduce the incentives to substitute tax avoidance with debt.

This paper examines the role of personal income taxes on multinationals' corporate tax-induced profit shifting. As mandated in most OECD countries, firms need economic substance in low corporate-tax countries to justify profit shifting to these countries. Because high personal income taxes raise labor costs and thus the cost of providing economic substance, we predict that personal income taxes mute profit shifting. Using data from 26 European countries, we find that personal income taxes substantially reduce profit shifting to low corporate-tax jurisdictions, particularly when parent countries impose strict substance requirements. We also find that firms use employees to justify economic substance and that the effect of the personal income tax is related to its incidence falling partly on firms. Our results show important interactions between personal and corporate income taxes that reduce multinationals’ profit-shifting activities when substance requirements are implemented as in the European Union or many OECD countries.

When corporate payout is taxed, internal equity (retained earnings) is cheaper than external equity (share issues). If there are no perfect substitutes for equity finance, payout taxes may therefore have an effect on the investment of firms. High taxes will favor investment by firms who can finance internally. Using an international panel with many changes in payout taxes, we show that this prediction holds well. Payout taxes have a large impact on the dynamics of corporate investment and growth. Investment is “locked in” in profitable firms when payout is heavily taxed. Thus, apart from any level effects, payout taxes change the allocation of capital.

We examine the consequences of corporate tax enforcement for business activity. Using two different empirical approaches—a regional design and a firm-level design—we document that corporate tax enforcement is negatively associated with business activity, as measured by establishments and employment. This association is economically significant and is robust to tests that mitigate concerns regarding endogeneity and measurement. Furthermore, we find that the negative association between tax enforcement and business activity varies substantially in the cross-section. Specifically, we find that it is weaker for regions and firms with greater access to external financing sources and is stronger for regions and firms where compliance costs are likely higher and for which the ex ante costs of tax enforcement are greater. Our findings suggest that the effects of tax enforcement on business activity are economically important and heterogeneous, which should be of interest to academics and policymakers.

This article studies how corporate tax hikes transmit across countries through multinationals’ internal networks of subsidiaries. We build a parsimonious multicountry model to highlight two opposing spillover effects: while tax competition between countries generates positive investment spillover, intra-firm production linkages predict negative spillover. Using subsidiary-level data and exogenous corporate tax hikes, we find that local business units cut investment by 0.5 percent for a 1 percent increase in foreign corporate tax. This result highlights the importance of production linkages in propagating foreign tax shocks, as the supply-chain-induced negative spillover dominates the positive spillover effect suggested by the conventional wisdom of tax competition.

This paper examines investment responses to emission taxes and the role of tax incidence in passing on tax burdens. Using private firms from Spain and the introduction of an emission tax in 2013 in the Autonomous Community Valenciana, we show that investments decline in response to the emission tax. Importantly, this investment decline does not depend on the level of pollution but on economic factors related to tax incidence. Investments in firms operating in highly competitive markets, firms with low pricing power, and firms with low financial flexibility are the most affected by environmental taxes. We generalize the investment findings using the introduction of carbon taxes in France and Ireland in a stacked difference-in-differences design. Overall, our results indicate that emission taxes affect not only polluters but also other firms and stakeholders such as suppliers, customers, and consumers depending on the relative elasticities of supply and demand. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text.

Using granular gas price data and rich variation in corporate tax rates, we find that corporate taxes increase consumer prices. About 64% of the corporate tax is borne by consumers. The effect is stronger when firms have limited access to tax planning opportunities, face stricter tax enforcement, or when consumer demand is less elastic. Taxes also reduce the number of firms and their scale, consistent with a tax‐induced increase in marginal cost. Our results suggest that tax policies that increase effective corporate tax rates may have unintended consequences for consumers through higher prices.

This paper investigates the effect of frictions in consumption taxes on firms' product mix decisions. We use a stacked difference-indifferences approach that exploits the staggered transition from a sales tax with the risk of tax cascading to a value added tax (VAT) with credits on inputs across states in India, as well as detailed data on listed manufacturing firms' production decisions. We find that the switch to a VAT system induces affected firms to narrow their product scope and to reduce vertical integration. That is, firms cut the internal production of input goods and instead focus their production on their best-performing products. Firms affected by the switch to VAT reduce their firm size and are more likely to outsource production of input goods. We also show that this vertical disintegration results in lower manufacturing costs, higher profitability and firm value, and increased investment efficiency for affected firms. Overall, the paper shows that alleviating frictions in sales tax or VAT systems can reduce investment and productivity distortions and improve the allocation of capital across firms.

This paper examines how firms’ tax policy expectations (TPE) evolve around and relate to their investment responses to changes in tax policy. Using a text‐based approach to measuring TPE, we find that two recent tax policy–changing events—namely, the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA)—spawned considerable between‐ and within‐firm variation in TPE, with aggregate time‐series patterns in TPE occasionally challenging prevailing assumptions in previous research. Further, we observe that event‐induced TPE relate to investment both before and in response to the TCJA's passage in 2017, with offsetting associations between its first and second moments, and that these TPE moderate the TCJA's intended investment‐stimulating effect. Furthermore, we document a difference between domestic and multinational firms in their TPE‐investment response, with the former (latter) more likely to adjust the level (shift the country location) of their investment. Overall, our findings support the idea that TPE can impact investment behavior in the face of a tax policy change and suggest that our methodology can be used by future research to incorporate TPE into analyses of tax policy effects.