Rationality leads people to imitate those with similar tastes but different information. But people who imitate common sources develop correlated beliefs, and rationality demands that later social learners take this correlation into account. This implies severe limits to rational imitation. We show that (i) in most natural observation structures besides the canonical single-file case, full rationality dictates that people must “anti-imitate” some of those they observe; and (ii) in every observation structure full rationality dictates that people imitate, on net, at most one person and are imitated by, on net, at most one person, over any set of interconnected players. We also show that in a very broad class of settings, any learning rule in which people regularly do imitate more than one person without anti-imitating others will lead to a positive probability of people converging to confident and wrong long-run beliefs.

We develop a model that fleshes out, extends, and modifies existing models of referencedependent preferences and loss aversion while accomodating most of the evidence motivating these models. Our approach makes reference-dependent theory more broadly applicable by avoiding some of the ways that prevailing models—if applied literally and without ancillary assumptions—make variously weak and incorrect predictions. Our model combines the reference-dependent gain-loss utility with standard economic “consumption utility ” and clarifies the relationship between the two. Most importantly, we posit that a person’s reference point is her recent expectations about outcomes (rather than the status quo), and assume that behavior accords to a personal equilibrium: The person maximizes utility given her rational expectations about outcomes, where these expectations depend on her own anticipated behavior. We apply our theory to consumer behavior, and emphasize that a consumer’s willingness to pay for a good is endogenously determined by the market distribution of prices and how she expects to respond to these prices. Because a buyer’s willingness to buy depends on whether she anticipates buying the good, for a range of market prices there are multiple personal equilibria. This multiplicity disappears when the consumer is sufficiently uncertain about the price she will face. Because paying more than she anticipated induces a sense of loss in the buyer, the lower the prices at which she expects to buy the lower will be her willingness to pay. In some situations, a known stochastic decrease in prices can even lower the quantity demanded.

We develop a model of the gambler's fallacy—the mistaken belief that random sequences should exhibit systematic reversals. We show that an individual who holds this belief and observes a sequence of signals can exaggerate the magnitude of changes in an underlying state but underestimate their duration. When the state is constant, and so signals are i.i.d., the individual can predict that long streaks of similar signals will continue—a hot-hand fallacy. When signals are serially correlated, the individual typically under-reacts to short streaks, over-reacts to longer ones, and under-reacts to very long ones. Our model has implications for a number of puzzles in finance, e.g. the active-fund and fund-flow puzzles, and the presence of momentum and reversal in asset returns.

A growing literature explores differences in subjective well-being across demographic groups, often relying on surveys with high nonresponse rates. By using the reported number of call attempts made to participants in the University of Michigan's Surveys of Consumers, we show that comparisons among easy-to-reach respondents differ from comparisons among hard-to-reach ones. Notably, easy-to-reach women are happier than easy-to-reach men, but hard-to-reach men are happier than hard-to-reach women, and conclusions of a survey could reverse with more attempted calls. Better alternatives to comparing group sample averages might include putting greater weight on hard-to-reach respondents or even extrapolating trends in responses.

We model a financial market where some traders of a risky asset do not fully appreciate what prices convey about others' private information. Markets comprising solely such “cursed” traders generate more trade than those comprising solely rationals. Because rationals arbitrage away distortions caused by cursed traders, mixed markets can generate even more trade. Per‐trader volume in cursed markets increases with market size; volume may instead disappear when traders infer others' information from prices, even when they dismiss it as noisier than their own. Making private information public raises rational and “dismissive” volume, but reduces cursed volume given moderate noninformational trading motives.