Abstract Panic-based (non-fundamental) spikes in depositors’ attention can be a source of bank fragility in theory, but separating such spikes from underlying fundamentals is challenging empirically. Using online search data, we show that during the Global Financial Crisis, UK banks facing surges in attention respond by increasing retail deposit rates, but only for instant withdrawal deposits. Exploiting variation across brands owned by the same bank (and thus sharing the same fundamentals), we find that banks respond even when surges are not justified by fundamentals. In addition, comparing onshore and offshore deposits by the same brand, we show that bank response is substantially stronger when the lack of deposit insurance and a larger presence of wholesale depositors magnifies potential losses to depositors.

Abstract We study political influences on private banks receiving government funds. Using spatial discontinuities associated with congressional district borders, we show that recipient banks of the 2008 Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) program increased mortgage and small business lending by 23–60% more in census tracts located just inside their home-representative’s district than just outside; the effect also shows up in higher loan acceptance rates, and mortgages more likely to be impaired or in default. The effect is stronger when the representative voted for TARP, is politically powerful, connected to the financial industry, and when the bank is important in the district. These findings suggest that obtaining public funds subjects firms to political influences, which affects the quantity and quality of corporate investment because of political considerations.

This article shows that lending relationships insulate corporate investment from fluctuations in collateral values. The sensitivity of corporate investment to changes in real-estate collateral values is halved when the length of relationship between a bank and a firm, or its board of directors, doubles. Long relationships with board members dominate relationships with the firm in dampening the collateral channel. Moreover, lending relationships with directors in their personal capacity insulate corporate investment over and above corporate relationships. Our findings support theories where collateral and private information are substitutes in mitigating credit frictions over the cycle and show that lending relationships are more multi-faceted than previously thought.