We examine the effect of underwriting relationships on analysts' earnings forecasts and recommendations. Lead and co-underwriter analysts' growth forecasts and recommendations are significantly more favorable than those made by unaffiliated analysts, although their earnings forecasts are not generally greater. Investors respond similarly to lead underwriter and unaffiliated `Strong buy' and `Buy' recommendations, but three-day returns to lead underwriter `Hold' recommendations are significantly more negative than those to unaffiliated `Hold' recommendations. The findings suggest investors expect lead analysts are more likely to recommend `Hold' when `Sell' is warranted. The post-announcement returns following affiliated and unaffiliated analysts' recommendations are not significantly different.

Maureen McNichols, Patricia C. O'Brien, Self-Selection and Analyst Coverage, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 35, Studies on Experts and the Application of Expertise in Accounting, Auditing, and Tax (1997), pp. 167-199

This paper investigates whether the market rewards firms meeting current period earnings expectations, and whether any such reward reflects the implications of meeting expectations in the current period for future earnings or reflects a distinct market premium. We document that abnormal annual returns are significantly greater for firms meeting expectations, controlling for the information in the current year’s earnings. We then test whether firms meeting expectations experience higher returns simply because their expected future earnings are also higher. We find firms meeting expectations have significantly higher earnings forecasts and realized earnings than firms that do not. We find that controlling for these higher future earnings, firms meeting expectations in one or two years do not receive a greater valuation than their fundamentals would suggest. We find, however, that the market assigns a higher value to firms that meet expectations consistently, controlling for an estimate of the firm’s fundamental value.

We examine bankruptcy within business groups. Groups have incentives to support financially distressed subsidiaries, as the bankruptcy of a subsidiary may impose severe costs on the group as a whole. This is in part because, in several countries, bankruptcy courts often “pierce the corporate veil” and hold groups liable for their distressed subsidiaries’ obligations as if they were their own. Using a large cross-country sample of group-affiliated firms, we show that, by reallocating resources within the corporate structure, business groups actively manage intra-group credit risk to prevent costly within-group insolvencies. Moreover, we document that recent regulatory changes in the approval and disclosure of related party transactions are costly for business groups in that they constrain their ability to shield their subsidiaries from credit-risk shocks. Our study informs the current regulatory debate on related party transactions by highlighting an important cost of anti-self-dealing regulation.