This paper evaluates hedge funds that grant favorable redemption terms to investors. Within this group of purportedly liquid funds, high net inflow funds subsequently outperform low net inflow funds by 4.79% per year after adjusting for risk. The return impact of fund flows is stronger when funds embrace liquidity risk, when market liquidity is low, and when funding liquidity, as measured by the Treasury-Eurodollar spread, aggregate hedge fund flows, and prime broker stock returns, is tight. In keeping with an agency explanation, funds with strong incentives to raise capital, low manager option deltas, and no manager capital co-invested are more likely to take on excessive liquidity risk. These results resonate with the theory of funding liquidity by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).

Using a proprietary database of currency trades, this paper explores the effects of trading gains and losses on risk-taking among large institutional investors. We find that institutional investors, unlike individuals, are not prone to the disposition effect. Instead, institutions aggressively reduce risk following losses and mildly increase risk following gains. This asymmetry is more pronounced later in the calendar year and among older and more experienced funds. We show that such performance dependence is consistent with dynamic loss aversion (Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001)) and overconfidence. In addition, prior institutional gains and losses have palpable implications for future prices.

Hedge funds that endorse the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) underperform other hedge funds after adjusting for risk but attract greater investor flows, accumulate more assets, and harvest greater fee revenues. Consistent with an agency explanation, the underperformance is driven by PRI signatories with low environmental, social, and governance (ESG) exposures and is greater for hedge funds with poor incentive alignment. To address endogeneity, we exploit regulatory reforms that enhance stewardship and show that the ESG exposure and relative performance of signatory funds improve post reforms. Our findings suggest that some hedge funds endorse responsible investment to pander to investor preferences.

An abundance of evidence relates facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR) to masculine behaviors in males. We show that hedge funds operated by high-fWHR managers underperform those operated by low-fWHR managers, bear greater downside risk, are more susceptible to fire sales, and fail more often. High-fWHR managers compensate for their underperformance by marketing their funds more aggressively, thereby garnering higher flows and fee revenues. By exploiting major personal events that shape testosterone, namely marriage and fatherhood, we trace the biological mechanism underlying the relation between fWHR and investment performance to circulating testosterone. Our findings are robust and extend to equity mutual funds.

We find that local analyst recommendations are systematically more optimistic than foreign analyst recommendations in emerging markets. The effects of this novel “home bias” among local analysts overwhelm any information asymmetry between foreign and local analysts. Consequently, local analyst upgrades underperform foreign analyst upgrades, while local analyst downgrades outperform foreign analyst downgrades. Neither foreign investors, local institutions, nor retail investors appear to be fully cognizant of this bias. Trade reactions suggest that foreign investors overestimate the bias in foreign analyst recommendations while local institutions underestimate the bias in local analyst recommendations. These results are pervasive across countries, time periods, and stock groupings, and can be traced to investment banking pressure.

Hedge funds managed by listed firms significantly under-perform funds managed by unlisted firms. The under-performance is more severe for funds with low manager deltas, poor governance, and no manager co-investment, or those managed by firms whose prices are sensitive to earnings news. Notwithstanding the under-performance, listed asset management firms raise more capital, by growing existing funds and launching new funds post listing, and harvest greater fee revenues than do comparable unlisted firms. The results are consistent with the view that, for asset management firms, going public weakens the alignment between ownership, control, and investment capital, thereby engendering conflicts of interest.

We explore the impact of limited attention by analyzing the performance of hedge fund managers who are distracted by marital events. We find that marriages and divorces are associated with significantly lower fund alpha, during the six-month period surrounding and the two-year period after the event. Busy managers who manage multiple funds and who are not part of a team are more affected by marital transitions. Inattentive managers place fewer active bets relative to their style peers, load more on index stocks, exhibit higher R-squareds with respect to systematic factors, and are more prone to the disposition effect.

Hedge fund teams with heterogeneous educational backgrounds, academic specializations, work experiences, genders, and races, outperform homogeneous teams after adjusting for risk and fund characteristics. An event study of manager team transitions, instrumental variable regressions, and an analysis of managers who simultaneously operate solo- and team-managed funds address endogeneity concerns. Diverse teams deliver superior returns by arbitraging more stock anomalies, avoiding behavioral biases, and minimizing downside risks. Moreover, diversity allows hedge funds to circumvent capacity constraints and generate persistent performance. Our results suggest that diversity adds value in asset management.

This paper introduces the concept of statistical arbitrage, a long horizon trading opportunity that generates a riskless profit and is designed to exploit persistent anomalies. Statistical arbitrage circumvents the joint hypothesis dilemma of traditional market efficiency tests because its definition is independent of any equilibrium model and its existence is incompatible with market efficiency. We provide a methodology to test for statistical arbitrage and then empirically investigate whether momentum and value trading strategies constitute statistical arbitrage opportunities. Despite adjusting for transaction costs, the influence of small stocks, margin requirements, liquidity buffers for the marking-to-market of short-sales, and higher borrowing rates, we find evidence that these strategies generate statistical arbitrage.