Using unique data at transaction and identity levels, we provide the first systematic study of interest rate swaps traded over the counter (OTC). We find substantial and persistent heterogeneity in derivative prices consistent with a pass-through of regulatory costs on to market prices via so-called valuation adjustments (XVA). A client pays a higher price to buy interest rate protection from a dealer (i.e., the client pays a higher fixed rate) if the contract is not cleared via a central counterparty. This OTC premium decreases by posting initial margins and with higher buyer’s creditworthiness. OTC premia are absent for dealers suggesting bargaining power.

We use proprietary transaction data on interest rate swaps to assess the effects of centralized trading, as mandated by Dodd–Frank, on market quality. Contracts with the most extensive centralized trading see liquidity metrics improve by between 12% and 19% relative to those of a control group. This is driven by a clear increase in competition between dealers, particularly in U.S. markets. Additionally, centralized trading has caused interdealer trading in EUR swap markets to migrate from the United States to Europe. This is consistent with swap dealers attempting to avoid being captured by the trade mandate in order to maintain market power.