Among Alfred E. “Fred” Kahn's many accomplishments, none is better remembered than his pivotal role in deregulation of the US airline industry. Kahn's commitment to marry core microeconomic principles with institutional analysis, willingness as Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board to step outside the “regulation as usual box,” and appealing wit made him the face of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, one of the great microeconomic policy triumphs. Lessons drawn from Kahn's work and the airline deregulation experience remain instructive for current academic research and regulatory policy design across broad sectors of the economy.

This study investigates product safety choices in the airline industry, with particular attention to the role of financial conditions. The analysis uses data on 35 large scheduled passenger airlines over the 1957-86 period to estimate the effect of profitability and other aspects of financial health on accident and incident rates. The results indicate that lower profitability is correlated with higher accident and incident rates, particularly for smaller carriers. These findings support a broad class of theoretical models that suggest links between financial conditions and product quality and may have significant implications for the allocation of safety inspection and enforcement resources.

Labor is likely to be an important claimant to firms' rents, particularly in a regulated environment. This study analyzes wage responses to trucking deregulation to test labor rent-sharing hypotheses. The results indicate substantial declines in union wages as a consequence of reduced regulatory rents. Union premia over nonunion wages fell from 50 percent to less than 30 percent, implying aggregate annual losses of $950 million to $1.6 billion. Rent spillovers to nonunion drivers and truck drivers outside the regulated trucking industry appear insignificant. The results suggest that union workers captured more than two-thirds of total industry rents and provide strong support for union rent-sharing hypotheses.

The authors study dispersion in the prices an airline charges to different passengers on the same route. This variation in fares is substantial: the expected absolute difference in fares between two passengers on a route is 36 percent of the airline's average ticket price. The pattern of observed price dispersion cannot easily be explained by cost differences alone. Dispersion increases on routes with more competition or lower flight density, consistent with discrimination based on customers' willingness to switch to alternative airlines or flights. The authors argue that the data support models of price discrimination in monopolistically competitive markets.