This study examines the relationship between cash holdings and the level of multinationality for a large international sample of firms from 40 countries. We consider two dimensions of diversification, geographical and industrial, and find a direct negative relation between both geographic and industrial diversification and cash holdings. This finding is consistent with the diversification argument that multinationals' headquarters plan their investment and cash needs in an efficient way across geographically diversified operations. We further examine whether there is a trade-off between two diversification strategies. The evidence shows that the effect of industrial diversification is negligible once firms are geographically diversified. By performing country-level tests, we also document some new evidence of international differences for the impacts of tax systems, investor protection, political stability, stock market development, economic size and growth, and national culture on the separate and joint effects of geographic and industrial diversifications.

WOS:000265098400003 (Nº de Acesso Web of Science)

We examine the first significant deregulation of U.S. disclosure requirements since the passage of the 1933/1934 Exchange and Securities Acts: the 2007 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 12h-6. Rule 12h-6 has made it easier for foreign firms to deregister with the SEC and thereby terminate their U.S. disclosure obligations. We show that the market reacted negatively to the announcement by the SEC that firms from countries with weak disclosure and governance regimes could more easily opt out of the stringent U.S. reporting and legal environment. We also find that since the rule's passage, an unprecedented number of firms have deregistered, and these firms often had been previous targets of U.S. class action securities lawsuits or SEC enforcement actions. Our findings suggest that shareholders of non-U.S firms place significant value on U.S. securities regulations, especially when the home country investor protections are weak.