We present evidence supporting the hypothesis that due to investor specialization and market segmentation, value‐relevant information diffuses gradually in financial markets. Using the stock market as our setting, we find that (i) stocks that are in economically related supplier and customer industries cross‐predict each other's returns, (ii) the magnitude of return cross‐predictability declines with the number of informed investors in the market as proxied by the level of analyst coverage and institutional ownership, and (iii) changes in the stock holdings of institutional investors mirror the model trading behavior of informed investors.

This paper uses recent regulations that have required some companies to increase the number of outside directors on their boards to generate estimates of the effect of board independence on performance that are largely free from endogeneity problems. Our main finding is that the effectiveness of outside directors depends on the cost of acquiring information about the firm: when the cost of acquiring information is low, performance increases when outsiders are added to the board, and when the cost of information is high, performance worsens when outsiders are added to the board. The estimates provide some of the cleanest estimates to date that board independence matters, and the finding that board effectiveness depends on information cost supports a nascent theoretical literature emphasizing information asymmetry. We also find that firms compose their boards as if they understand that outsider effectiveness varies with information costs.

We examine the effects of physiology and spiritual sentiment on economic decision‐making in the context of Ramadan, an entire lunar month of daily fasting and increased spiritual reflection in the Muslim faith. Using an administrative data set of bank loans originated in Turkey during 2003 to 2013, we find that small business loans originated during Ramadan are 15% more likely to default within two years of origination. Loans originated in hot Ramadans, when adverse physiological effects of fasting are greatest, and those approved by the busiest bank branches perform worse. Despite their worse performance, Ramadan loans have lower credit spreads.