We exploit the information content of option prices to construct a novel measure of bank tail risk. We document a persistent increase in tail risk for the U.S. banking industry following the global financial crisis, except for banks designated as systemically important by the Dodd–Frank Act. We show that this post-crisis difference in tail risk for large and small banks is consistent with the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) status of large banks being reinforced by the Dodd–Frank designation: Naming the banks whose failure could threaten the financial stability of the U.S. gave investors a list of banks the government deemed as TBTF.

We provide evidence that managerial incentives to manipulate real activities can influence the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Increases in federal spending lead government-dependent firms to expand research and development (R&D) investment whereas industry-peer firms contract. The net result is a reduction in industry-level R&D investment. We find evidence of a novel mechanism for the crowding out of peer-firm investment: peer-firm managers respond to falling relative performance by cutting R&D to manage current earnings upward. We show that these differential responses manifest in firm value. These findings are robust to endogeneity and selection concerns as well as a battery of alternative explanations.

We exploit exogenous variation in the scheduling of gubernatorial elections to study the timing of bank failure in the US. Using hazard analysis, we show that bank failure is about 45% less likely in the year leading up to an election. Political control (i.e., lack of competition) can explain all of this average election year fall in the hazard rate. In particular, we show that the reduction in hazard rate doubles in magnitude for banks operating in states where the governor has simultaneous control of the upper and lower houses of the state legislature (i.e., complete control) heading into an election.

We show that political polarization among directors negatively affects corporate board effectiveness by reducing forced CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. Our results are more pronounced in presidential election years and for firms with more monitoring and advising needs. Polarization also increases the departure likelihood for directors who are ideologically distant from the rest of the board, making boards more politically homogeneous over time. Finally, we show that polarization in the boardroom lowers firms' investment- Q sensitivity and Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) performance. Our findings highlight the real economic cost of political polarization.

We show that global political uncertainty, measured by the U.S. election cycle, on average, leads to a fall in equity returns in fifty non-U.S. countries. At the same time, market volatilities rise, local currencies depreciate, and sovereign bond returns increase. The effect of global political uncertainty on equity prices increases with the level of uncertainty in U.S. election outcomes and a country’s equity market exposure to foreign investors, but does not vary with the country’s international trade exposure. These findings suggest that global political uncertainty increases investors’ aggregate risk aversion, leading to a flight to safety.

We examine the nature of state blockholding across publicly listed firms in East Asia by assembling a unique dataset spanning 16 years and 9 economies. Our newly compiled data identifies ultimate owners for each firm annually between 1997 and 2012, totaling 2984 firm-year observations. Three findings stand out. First, large changes (>5%) to state blockholdings – both investments and divestments – are quite prevalent. Second, the identity of the largest shareholder frequently changes over time between state, family, and widely-held entities. Third, sovereign wealth funds are far more likely to acquire rather than sell large stakes in publicly traded firms.