This paper investigates the impact of family ownership on credit rationing using a rich sample of Italian firms. Estimation results indicate that family owned firms are more likely to experience credit restrictions. The adverse impact of family ownership on credit rationing is particularly relevant for small-sized firms, whereas it is mitigated in firms with closer lending relationships. Finally, we find some evidence that family firms with high ownership concentration are more likely to be rationed by banks.

Using a rich sample of small and medium-sized European manufacturers, we investigate the nexus between banks’ relationship lending technologies and firms’ export activities during the 2009 great trade collapse. We find that the contraction of firms’ export was milder when banks had access to up-to-date “soft” information on firms’ export prospects. However, we find no evidence of an association between the resilience of firms’ export and banks’ experience on firms’ past activities. The nexus between export resilience and banks’ access to soft information is especially tight for young and small exporters and for firms at an early stage of internationalization.

Using firm-level survey information, we investigate whether relationship lending affects firms’ employment decisions in the face of negative sales shock. We find that firms with a durable relationship with their main bank display significantly less employment growth sensitivity to such shocks, especially where these are transitory. The result is stronger for younger and smaller firms that benefit from tighter bank-firm relationships, and for firms in sectors or economic environments where the costs of employment adjustment are greater. Our findings indicate that relationship lending provides liquidity insurance to firms to meet their demand for labor hoarding.