We investigate the monitoring quality of accountants with ties to the Mafia in their role as auditors for “clean” firms—those with no known ties to organized crime. Using a proprietary government database, we identify Italian firms with alleged ties to the Mafia through their executives, directors, or shareholders. We define “suspect accountants” as those who serve as auditors for these Mafia‐connected firms, acknowledging their potential associations with criminal entities. We predict and find evidence that “clean” clients (treatment group) monitored by suspect accountants are more likely to engage in earnings management practices that reduce taxable income, compared with a control sample of “clean” firms monitored by accountants with no known Mafia ties (control group). Our findings suggest that accountants with ties to the Mafia act as low‐quality monitors in the “clean” economy.

We examine how similarity in institutional, legal, and social characteristics between a firm's and its directors’ home countries, that is, country‐pair homophily, affects foreign director appointments. We estimate a gravity model that includes economic and geographic proximity and find that country‐pair homophily is a significant determinant of foreign director appointments to corporate boards. We also find that country‐pair homophily limits the appointments of foreign directors from high‐quality governance countries to firms located in low‐quality governance countries, which may reduce the role of board internationalization in promoting the global convergence of governance practices. We analyze changes in foreign director appointments around the international adoption of IFRS and Norway's gender‐quota rule and find a higher appointment likelihood for directors originating from countries that are institutionally and culturally similar to that of the firm. Our findings point to the critical role that country‐pair homophily plays in matching director to boards with implications for the diffusion of governance practices globally.