In this model, the effects of advertising are infinitely durable, fixed (and sunk) costs give rise to economies of scale, post-entry behavior is noncooperative, and pre-entry expectations are rational. Despite the obvious resemblance to work on the use of investment in production capacity to deter entry, here the incumbent monopolist never finds it optimal to advertise more if entry is possible than if it is not. This result and other features of this model indicate the dangers of analyzing advertising with analogies to other sorts of investments. The results make clear the need for more theoretical work on advertising and entry deterrence.

Noncooperative oligopoly behavior in nonrenewable resource markets is analyzed under stationary conditions assuming perfect information. The existence of Cournot-Nash equilibria in output paths is established under standard cost and demand assumptions, and a number of comparative dynamic results are obtained. If all suppliers have the same costs, for instance, and total reserves are fixed, either increasing the number of suppliers or equalizing their reserve holdings causes more rapid resource use. If suppliers' costs differ, it is shown that equilibrium involves inefficient production; high-cost reserves may even be exhausted before low-cost reserves.

Continuing rapid growth in U.S. gasoline consumption threatens to exacerbate environmental and congestion problems. We use flexible semiparametric and nonparametric methods to guide analysis of household gasoline consumption, and including this variable cuts the estimated income elasticity in half. Slower projected future growth in licensed drivers points to slower growth in gasoline consumption. A parsimonious representation of age, income, lifecycle and location effects is developed and tested. We show how flexible methods also helped reveal fundamental problems with the available price data.