This paper develops a tractable version of the Lucas and Prescott (1974) search model. Each of a continuum of industries produces a heterogeneous good using a production technology that is continually hit by idiosyncratic shocks. In response to adverse shocks, some workers search for new industries while others are rest unemployed, waiting for their industry's condition to improve. We obtain closed-form expressions for key aggregate variables and use them to evaluate the model's quantitative predictions for unemployment and wages. Both search and rest unemployment are important for understanding the behavior of wages at the industry level.

We study unemployment insurance for workers who sequentially sample job opportunities. We focus on the optimal timing of benefits and the desirability of allowing borrowing and saving. When workers have constant absolute risk aversion, a simple policy is optimal: a constant benefit during unemployment, a constant tax during employment, and free access to a riskless asset. With constant relative risk aversion, optimal policy involves nearly constant benefits; more elaborate policies offer minuscule welfare gains. We highlight two distinct policy roles: ensuring workers have sufficient liquidity to smooth their consumption; and providing unemployment subsidies to insure against uncertain spell duration.

Report: Ad Hoc Search Committee for the Editor of the American Economic Journal: Economic Policy by David Cutler, Amy Finkelstein, Adriana Lleras-Muney, James Poterba, David Romer and Robert Shimer. Published in volume 103, issue 3, pages 774 of American Economic Review, May 2013