ABSTRACT Investors, regulators, academics, and researchers all emphasize the importance of financial statement comparability. However, an empirical construct of comparability is typically not specified. In addition, little evidence exists on the benefits of comparability to users. This study attempts to fill these gaps by developing a measure of financial statement comparability. Empirically, this measure is positively related to analyst following and forecast accuracy, and negatively related to analysts? dispersion in earnings forecasts. These results suggest that financial statement comparability lowers the cost of acquiring information, and increases the overall quantity and quality of information available to analysts about the firm.

The effect of oral administration of iron on haematological, biochemical and immunological parameters in neonatal calves was studied. Ten calves from a private farm in Gharbia Governorate were used. Calves were separated from their dams immediately after birth and received colostrum during the first hours after calving and twice daily for 48 h. Thereafter, they received whole milk. Calves were divided into two equal groups. The first group was kept as controls. Calves of the second group were given ferrous sulphate at a dose of 250 mg/calf daily, beginning at one day of age; this was continued for 28 days. Three blood samples were collected from each calf in all groups at 14, 21, 28 and 35 days of age. Iron administration produced a significant increase in red blood cell count, haemoglobin, packed cell volume and blood indices, in addition to non-significant changes in total and differential leukocyte counts. The administration of iron resulted in a significant increase in serum iron, total proteins, globulins, thyroid hormones, lymphocyte stimulation index, phagocytosis, body weight and body gain. The administration of iron is suggested as routine practice in calf-producing farms due to its advantageous effects on the parameters tested.

We analyse a two-player game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits. Either player has to decide in continuous time whether to use a safe arm with a known pay-off or a risky arm whose expected pay-off per unit of time is initially unknown. This pay-off can be high or low and is negatively correlated across players. We characterize the set of all Markov perfect equilibria in the benchmark case where the risky arms are known to be of opposite type and construct equilibria in cut-off strategies for arbitrary negative correlation. All strategies and pay-offs are in closed form. In marked contrast to the case where both risky arms are of the same type, there always exists an equilibrium in cut-off strategies, and there always exists an equilibrium exhibiting efficient long-run patterns of learning. These results extend to a three-player game with common knowledge that exactly one risky arm is of the high pay-off type.

We evaluate financial assets with payoffs linked to individual labor income, as conceived by Shiller (2003) and others. Using a realistically calibrated life-cycle model, we find that such assets can generate nontrivial welfare benefits, depending on the precise structure of the instrument. However, the assets we consider can only eliminate a relatively small fraction of the welfare costs of labor income risk over the life cycle. We highlight the fact that although the purpose of such assets is to smooth consumption across states of nature, one must also consider the assets' effects on households' ability to smooth consumption over time.

This paper derives optimal lifecycle asset allocations for consumers who select work hours and retirement ages given uncertain labor income and investment returns. These shocks shape retirement and asset allocation patterns in complex ways: negative labor market shocks and high stock returns influence the young to work less and buy more annuities, and later, to retire early. This flexibility enhances welfare; our model also fits several important empirical stylized facts including the two peaks in retirement rates, the hump-shaped pattern of work hours, the sizeable discontinuity in consumption at retirement, and low annuity take-ups of older households.

We examine the effect of litigation risk on managers' decision to issue earnings forecasts. We use a new ex ante measure of litigation risk, namely, the Directors and Officers liability insurance premium. This choice bypasses significant problems associated with the estimation of ex ante litigation risk in prior studies. By using this measure of litigation risk, our results are more intuitively appealing. We find that when faced with ex ante litigation risk, managers with bad news are more likely to issue an earnings warning. For good news firms, we do not see this effect. We also examine three forecast characteristics: forecast horizon, extent of news revealed and forecast precision. Firms with higher litigation risk tend to issue earnings forecasts earlier if they have bad news but not so when they have good news. They also reveal less news in the forecasts if they have good news. As litigation risk increases, bad news earnings forecasts become more precise. Good news earnings forecasts, however, tend to become less precise relative to bad news forecasts. This differential effect of litigation risk on management earnings forecasts, based on the direction of news, has not been documented by previous studies.

The 1987 market crash was associated with a dramatic and permanent steepening of the implied volatility curve for equity index options, despite minimal changes in aggregate consumption. We explain these events within a general equilibrium framework in which expected endowment growth and economic uncertainty are subject to rare jumps. The arrival of a jump triggers the updating of agents' beliefs about the likelihood of future jumps, which produces a market crash and a permanent shift in option prices. Consumption and dividends remain smooth, and the model is consistent with salient features of individual stock options, equity returns, and interest rates.

The consumption literature uses adult equivalence scales to measure individual-level inequality. This practice imposes the assumption that there is no within-household inequality. In this paper, we show that ignoring consumption inequality within households produces misleading estimates of inequality along two dimensions. To illustrate this point, we use a collective model of household behaviour to estimate consumption inequality in the U.K. from 1968 to 2001. First, the use of adult equivalence scales underestimates the initial level of cross-sectional consumption inequality by 50%, as large differences in the earnings of husbands and wives translate into large differences in consumption allocations within households. Second, we estimate the rise in between-household inequality has been accompanied by an offsetting reduction in within-household inequality. Our findings also indicate that increases in marital sorting on wages and hours worked can simultaneously explain two-thirds of the decline in within-household inequality and between a quarter and one-half of the rise in between-household inequality for one and two adult households.

Whether campaign advertising influences election outcomes is an open question; a paradox given the amount spent on campaigning in general and TV advertising in particular. We argue that such “absence of documentation” is due to the focus of the empirical literature on the United States, in which the allocation of campaign spending and advertising is decentralized. We explore a quasinatural experiment that enables us to mitigate the omitted variables and reverse causality problems caused by decentralized allocation. In Brazil, gubernatorial elections work in a two-round system. In the first round, candidates’ TV time shares are determined by their coalitions’ share of seats in the National Parliament. In the second round, TV time is split equally between the first-round winner and runner-up. Using differences between rounds as a source of variation, we find a large causal effect of TV advertising on election outcomes.