Our primary contribution to the finance literature is the introduction of folklore narratives as a major factor in influencing corporate outcomes. Using the initial public offering (IPO) underpricing as the main focus, we demonstrate that folklore narratives depicting lower tolerance toward antisocial behavior are associated with lower IPO underpricing. The relation between folklore narratives and IPO pricing is independent of indicators of trust, religion, culture, societal preferences, or institutional democracy. This relation is weaker in countries with a more transparent information environment and following reforms that improve disclosure and corporate governance. Folklore narratives on punishment for antisocial behavior are also related to enhanced information disclosure, lower agency problems, better long-term performance for IPO firms, higher proceeds raised and free float, and overall IPO activity in the market. Collectively, we show that informal institutions, such as folklore narratives, exert a strong influence on IPO outcomes globally.

We find that U.S. corporations increase their cash holdings in response to higher economic policy uncertainty. The increase in cash holdings is not attributed to a reduction in firm investments. This increase is more pronounced for financially constrained firms or those with larger exposure to policy uncertainty. Holding more cash in the presence of policy uncertainty alleviates the negative impact of policy uncertainty on capital investment and firm innovation outputs. Our findings demonstrate that cash holdings represent an important channel in mitigating the negative effect of policy uncertainty on firm real economic activities.

Using insights from prosecuted cases, we present compelling evidence of large-trade based manipulation in a sizeable number of Indian IPOs that, in all likelihood escaped enforcement actions. Consistent with the pump-and-dump scheme these IPOs exhibit abnormally high volume of large trades, a significant fraction of which originates from a syndicate of traders present in the prosecuted IPOs. More importantly, stock price in the manipulated IPOs rises initially on account of artificial trades, but then declines significantly as the manipulators exit the market. Interestingly, not all attempts at manipulation are entirely successful as stock price in some of the manipulated IPOs crash on the first day of listing.

This paper examines the role of local attitudes toward gambling on corporate innovative activity. Using a county’s Catholics-to-Protestants ratio as a proxy for local gambling preferences, we find that firms located in gambling-prone areas tend to undertake riskier projects, spend more on innovation, and experience greater innovative output. We contrast the local gambling effect with chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence, another behavioral effect reported to influence innovation. We find that local gambling preferences are a stronger determinant of innovative activity, with CEO overconfidence being more relevant to innovation in areas where gambling attitudes are strong.

This paper examines whether cultural dimensions explain the variation in corporate cash holdings around the world as well as within the United States. We establish four major findings. First, in an international setting, corporate cash holdings are negatively associated with individualism and positively associated with uncertainty-avoidance. Second, individualism and uncertainty avoidance influence the precautionary motive for holding cash. Third, firms in individualistic states in the United States hold less cash than firms in collectivistic states. Fourth, we show that individualism is positively related to the firm’s capital expenditures, acquisitions, and repurchases while uncertainty avoidance is negatively related. Our findings remain unchanged after controlling for governance factors, firm attributes, and country characteristics.