How should regulators design effective emergency lending facilities to mitigate stigma during a financial crisis? I explore this question using data from an unexpected disclosure of partial lists of banks that secretly borrowed from the lender of last resort during the Great Depression. I find evidence of stigma in that depositors withdrew more deposits from banks included on the lists in comparison with banks left off the lists. Overall, the results suggest that an emergency lending facility that never reveals bank identities would mitigate stigma.

We examine how the threat of disclosure (stigma) changes the quality of banks that approach emergency lending facilities. We study a financial crisis where two confidential facilities were available to banks. Unexpectedly, a partial list of bank names from one facility was published, suddenly stigmatizing that facility. We find that the composition of banks that approached each facility changed, where the newly stigmatized facility attracted weaker banks that maintained smaller liquidity buffers, while the alternative confidential facility attracted both weaker and stronger banks. Our results shed light on how stigma prevents regulators from reaching many banks to inject critical liquidity into the banking sector during a crisis.