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Corporate carbon accounting: balance sheets and flow statements

Review of Accounting Studies 2024 29(3), 2125-2156 open access
Current corporate disclosures regarding carbon emissions lack generally accepted accounting rules. The transactional carbon accounting system described here takes the rules of historical cost accounting for operating assets as a template for generating carbon emissions (CE) statements comprising a balance sheet and a flow statement. The asset side of the CE balance sheet reports the carbon emissions embodied in operating assets. The liability side conveys the firm’s cumulative direct emissions into the atmosphere as well as the cumulative emissions embodied in goods acquired from suppliers less those sold to customers. Flow statements report the company’s annual corporate carbon footprint calculated as the cradle-to-gate carbon footprint of goods sold during the current period. Taken together, balance sheets and flow statements generate key performance indicators of a company’s past, current, and future performance in the domain of carbon emissions.

Decentralized capacity management and internal pricing

Review of Accounting Studies 2010 15(3), 442-478 open access
This paper studies the acquisition and subsequent utilization of production capacity in a multidivisional firm. In a setting where an upstream division provides capacity services for itself and a downstream division, our analysis explores whether the divisions should be structured as investment or profit centers. The choice of responsibility centers is naturally linked to the internal pricing rules for capacity services. As a benchmark, we establish the efficiency of an arrangement in which the upstream division is organized as an investment center, and capacity services to the downstream division are priced at full historical cost. Such responsibility center arrangements may, however, be vulnerable to dynamic hold-up problems whenever the divisional capacity assignments are fungible in the short-run, and therefore, it is essential to let divisional managers negotiate over their actual capacity assignments. The dynamic hold-up problem can be alleviated with more symmetric choice of responsibility centers. The firm can centralize ownership of capacity assets with the provision that both divisions rent capacity on a periodic basis from a central unit. An alternative and more decentralized solution is obtained by a system of bilateral capacity ownership in which both divisions become investment centers.

Relating Product Prices to Long‐Run Marginal Cost: Evidence from Solar Photovoltaic Modules

Contemporary Accounting Research 2018 35(3), 1464-1498 open access
A basic tenet of microeconomics is that for a competitive industry in equilibrium the market price of a product will be equal to its marginal cost. This paper develops a model framework and a corresponding empirical inference procedure for estimating long‐run marginal cost in industries where production costs decline over time. In the context of the solar photovoltaic (PV) module industry, we rely primarily on firm‐level financial accounting data to estimate the long‐run marginal cost of PV modules for the years 2008–2013. During those years, the industry experienced both unprecedented price declines and significant expansions of manufacturing capacity. We compare the trajectory of average sales prices with the estimated long‐run marginal costs in order to quantify the extent to which actual price declines were attributable to reductions in production costs. The trajectory of estimated product costs is then extrapolated to forecast an equilibrium trend line for future PV module prices.

Levelized Product Cost: Concept and Decision Relevance

The Accounting Review 2015 90(4), 1653-1682 open access
We examine a life-cycle cost concept that applies to both manufacturing and service industries in which upfront capacity investments are essential. Borrowing from the energy literature, we refer to this cost measure as the Levelized Product Cost (LC). Per unit of output, the levelized cost aggregates a share of the initial capacity investment with periodic fixed and variable operating costs. We relate this cost measure to the notion of full cost, as commonly calculated in managerial accounting texts. Our analysis identifies conditions under which the LC can be interpreted as the long-run marginal product cost. In particular, the LC is the relevant unit cost that firms should impute for investments in productive capacity.

Executive Compensation Tied to ESG Performance: International Evidence

Journal of Accounting Research 2023 61(3), 805-853 open access
Using a wide sample of international publicly traded firms, this paper studies the rapidly increasing practice of incorporating Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) metrics in executive compensation contracts. Our evidence suggests that this compensation practice varies at the country, industry, and firm levels in ways that are consistent with efficient incentive contracting. We also observe that reliance on ESG metrics in executive compensation arrangements is associated with engagement, voting, and trading by institutional investors, which suggests that firms could be adopting this practice to align their management's objectives with the preferences of certain shareholder groups. Finally, we find that the adoption of ESG Pay is accompanied by improvements in key ESG outcomes, but not by improvements in financial performance.