We investigate the interaction of mandatory disclosure and the gathering of decision‐relevant information in a setting in which a competitor may enter the market. Gathering detailed information allows for an efficient allocation of resources, but eventually attracts competition by revealing beneficial information to competitors. In contrast, refraining from generating detailed information implies inefficient decisions, but eventually prevents competitors from entering the market. Our results show that an incentive not to generate internal information arises for two reasons: If the incumbent's cost advantage is sufficiently large, disclosing aggregated information can be an instrument to avoid competition by reducing the likelihood of market entry. If the incumbent's cost advantage is small, disclosing aggregated information attracts competition by increasing the likelihood of market entry. In this case, imprecise cost information serves as a commitment device to reduce the intensity of competition by forcing the competitor to take into account his efficiency disadvantage in making his production decision.

The above article has been retracted at the request of authors Robert Libby and Hun‐Tong Tan, in agreement with the Editor‐in‐Chief, Patricia C. O'Brien, the copyright holder, the Canadian Academic Accounting Association (CAAA), and Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Bentley University conducted an investigation confirming that Dr. J. E. Hunton, while a faculty member at Bentley University and without the knowledge of his co‐authors, engaged in research misconduct, specifically data fabrication. Dr. Hunton provided the data used in the above study, and did not respond to a request for comment. Based on Bentley's initial report and further investigation into details specific to this paper, we conclude that the validity of the data cannot be confirmed. To correct the academic literature and maintain standards of academic integrity, we therefore retract the paper. The article was published online in Contemporary Accounting Research on 13 May 2010, in Wiley Online ( wileyonlinelibrary.com ). Reference Tan , H.‐T. , R. Libby , and J. E. Hunton . 2010 . . Contemporary Accounting Research 27 (): 187 – 208 . doi: 10.1111/j.1911‐3846.2010.01006.x

We investigate the separate and joint influences of social engagement measures on stock market participation and find that socially engaged individuals are more likely to participate. Consistent with Granovetter’s theory of social networks we find that a weak tie (measured by social group involvement) has a positive effect on stock market participation whereas a strong tie (measured by frequency of talking to neighbors) has no effect. More trusting individuals are more likely to participate in the stock market, as are those who identify with a political party. In contrast, the degree to which religion is important appears to have little impact.

Traditional models of insurance choice are predicated on fully informed and rational consumers protecting themselves from exposure to financial risk. In practice, choosing an insurance plan is a complicated decision often made without full information. In this paper we combine new administrative data on health plan choices and claims with unique survey data on consumer information to identify risk preferences, information frictions, and hassle costs. Our additional friction measures are important predictors of choices and meaningfully impact risk preference estimates. We study the implications of counterfactual insurance allocations to illustrate the importance of distinguishing between these micro-foundations for welfare analysis.

This paper compares the value of political ties and market credibility in China by examining the consequence of corporate scandals. We categorize Chinese corporate scandals by whether the scandal is primarily associated with the destruction of (i) the firm's political networks (political scandals), (ii) the firm's market credibility (market scandals), or (iii) both (mixed scandals). Consistent with our hypothesis that scandals signaling the destruction of political ties are associated with greater losses in firm value than scandals signaling the destruction of market credibility, we find that the stock market reacts more negatively to political and mixed scandals than to market scandals. In addition, the greater negative market reactions associated with political and mixed scandals are primarily driven by firms that rely more on political networks. We also find that, compared to market scandals, political and mixed scandals lead to larger decreases in operating performance, greater reduction in loans from state‐owned banks, and higher departure of political directors.

This paper tests the proposition that politicians and their affiliated firms (i.e., firms operating in their province) temporarily suppress negative information in response to political incentives. We examine the stock price behavior of Chinese listed firms around two visible political events—meetings of the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and promotions of high‐level provincial politicians—that are expected to asymmetrically increase the costs of releasing bad news. The costs create an incentive for local politicians and their affiliated firms to temporarily restrict the flow of negative information about the companies. The result will be fewer stock price crashes for the affiliated firms during these event windows, followed by an increase in crashes after the event. Consistent with these predictions, we find that the affiliated firms experience a reduction (an increase) in negative stock return skewness before (after) the event. These effects are strongest in the three‐month period directly preceding the event, among firms that are more politically connected, and when the province is dominated by faction politics and cronyism. Additional tests document a significant reduction in published newspaper articles about affected firms in advance of these political events, suggestive of a link between our observed stock price behavior and temporary shifts in the listed firms’ information environment.

Multi-asset class, multimarket central counterparties (CCPs) are becoming less uncommon as a result of merges between specialized (single-asset class, single market) CCPs and market demands for greater capital efficiency. Yet, traditional CCP risk management models often lack the necessary sophistication to estimate potential losses relative to the closeout process of a defaulter’s portfolio in a multi-asset class, multimarket environment. As a result, multi-asset class, multimarket CCPs usually rely on a simplified silo approach for risk calculation which not only fails to deliver efficiency, but may also increase systemic risk. The CORE (Closeout Risk Evaluation) approach, on the other hand, provides conceptual and mathematical tools necessary for robust and efficient central counterparty risk evaluation in multi-asset class and multimarket environments, acknowledging the portfolio dynamics involved in the closeout process as well as important “real life” market frictions.