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Spillovers from Costly Credit

Review of Financial Studies 2018 31(9), 3568-3594 open access
Low-income households with proximate access to payday loans exhibit greater economic distress, higher take-up of food assistance benefits, and greater delinquency on child support payments than peers without proximate loan access. These findings suggest that borrowing can exacerbate distress, leading borrowers to use transfer programs and to prioritize payday loan payments over other liabilities like child support. In that way, payday lending produces negative externalities—costs imposed on taxpayers that fund transfer programs and nonresident family members that fail to receive child support. Received August 13, 2014; editorial decision December 5, 2016 by Editor Alexander Ljungqvist.

Identification of Nonparametric Simultaneous Equations Models With a Residual Index Structure

Econometrica 2018 86(1), 289-315 open access
We present new identification results for a class of nonseparable nonparametric simultaneous equations models introduced by Matzkin (2008). These models combine traditional exclusion restrictions with a requirement that each structural error enter through a “residual index.†Our identification results are constructive and encompass a range of special cases with varying demands on the exogenous variation provided by instruments and the shape of the joint density of the structural errors. The most important results demonstrate identification when instruments have only limited variation. Even when instruments vary only over a small open ball, relatively mild conditions on the joint density suffice. We also show that the primary sufficient conditions for identification are verifiable and that the maintained hypotheses of the model are falsifiable.

When Is Social Responsibility Socially Desirable?

Journal of Labor Economics 2018 36(4), 1023-1072 open access
We study a model in which corporate social responsibility arises in response to inefficient regulation. In our model, firms, governments, and workers interact. Firms create negative spillovers that can be attenuated through government regulation, which is set endogenously and may not be socially optimal. Companies can hire socially responsible employees who enjoy correcting spillovers. Because firms can capture rents created by allowing this, they sometimes find it optimal to lobby for inefficient rules and then encourage socially responsible behavior in their midst. Thus, social responsibility can either increase or decrease social welfare, depending on the costs of political capture.

Who Gets Hired? The Importance of Competition among Applicants

Journal of Labor Economics 2018 36(S1), S133-S181 open access
Being hired into a job depends not only on one’s own skill but also on that of other applicants. When another able applicant applies, a well-suited worker may be forced into unemployment or into accepting an inferior job. A model of this process defines over- and underqualification and provides predictions on its prevalence and on the wages of mismatched workers. It also implies that unemployment is concentrated among the least skilled workers, while vacancies are concentrated among high-skilled jobs. Four data sets are used to confirm the implications and establish that the hiring probability is low when competing applicants are able.

The History of the Cross-Section of Stock Returns

Review of Financial Studies 2018 31(7), 2606-2649 open access
Using data spanning the twentieth century, we show that the majority of accounting-based return anomalies, including investment, are most likely an artifact of data snooping. When examined out-of-sample by moving either backward or forward in time, the average returns and Sharpe ratios of most anomalies decrease, whereas their volatilities and correlations with other anomalies increase. The few anomalies that do persist out-of-sample correlate with the shift from investment in physical capital to intangible capital and the increasing reliance on debt financing over the twentieth century. Received November 25, 2016; editorial decision September 23, 2017 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

Positive Spillovers and Free Riding in Advertising of Prescription Pharmaceuticals: The Case of Antidepressants

Journal of Political Economy 2018 126(1), 381-437 open access
Exploiting the discontinuity in advertising along the borders of television markets, I estimate that television advertising of prescription antidepressants exhibits significant positive spillovers on rivals’ demand. I apply this identification in a demand model, where estimated parameters indicate significant and persistent spillovers driven by market expansion. Using the demand estimates to calibrate a stylized supply model, I explore the consequences of the positive spillovers on firm advertising choice. Compared with a competitive benchmark in which firms optimally free ride, simulations suggest that a category-wide advertising cooperative would produce a significant increase in total advertising.

Imputation in U.S. Manufacturing Data and Its Implications for Productivity Dispersion

The Review of Economics and Statistics 2018 100(3), 502-509 open access
In the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2002 and 2007 Censuses of Manufactures, 79% and 73% of observations, respectively, have imputed data for at least one variable used to compute total factor productivity (TFP). The bureau primarily imputes for missing values using mean-imputation methods, which can reduce the underlying variance of the imputed variables. For five variables entering TFP, we show that dispersion is significantly smaller in the Census mean-imputed versus the nonimputed data. We use classification and regression trees (CART) to produce multiple imputations with observed data for similar plants. For 90% of the 473 industries in 2002 and 84% of the 471 industries in 2007, we find that TFP dispersion increases as we move from Census mean-imputed data to nonimputed data to the CART-imputed data.

Noncognitive Abilities and Financial Delinquency: The Role of Self‐Efficacy in Avoiding Financial Distress

Journal of Finance 2018 73(6), 2837-2869 open access
We investigate a novel determinant of financial distress, namely, individuals' self‐efficacy, or belief that their actions can influence the future. Individuals with high self‐efficacy are more likely to take precautions that mitigate adverse financial shocks. They are subsequently less likely to default on their debt and bill payments, especially after experiencing negative shocks such as job loss or illness. Thus, noncognitive abilities are an important determinant of financial fragility and subjective expectations are an important factor in household financial decisions.

Are charter value and supervision aligned? A segmentation analysis

Journal of Financial Stability 2018 37, 60-73 open access
Previous work suggests that the charter value hypothesis is theoretically grounded and empirically supported, but not universally. Accordingly, this paper aims to perform an analysis of the relations between charter value, risk taking, and supervision, taking into account the relations’ complexity. Specifically, using the CAMELS rating system as a general framework for supervision, we study how charter value relates to risk and supervision by means of classification and regression tree analysis. The sample covers the period 2005–2016 and consists of listed banks in countries that were members of the Eurozone when it came into existence, along with Greece. To evaluate the crisis consequences, we also separately analyze four subperiods and countries that required financial aid from third parties and those that did not so, along with large and small banks. Our results reflect the complexity of the relations between charter value, supervision, and risk. Indeed, supervision and charter value seem aligned regarding only some types of risk.

Are overconfident CEOs better leaders? Evidence from stakeholder commitments

Journal of Financial Economics 2018 127(3), 519-545 open access
We find evidence that the leadership of overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs) induces stakeholders to take actions that contribute to the leader's vision. By being intentionally overexposed to the idiosyncratic risk of their firms, overconfident CEOs exhibit a strong belief in their firms’ prospects. This belief attracts suppliers beyond the firm's observable expansionary corporate activities. Overconfident CEOs induce more supplier commitments including greater relationship-specific investment and longer relationship duration. Overconfident CEOs also induce stronger labor commitments as employees exhibit lower turnover rates and greater ownership of company stock in benefit plans.