This paper reviews the book Why Muslim Integration Fails in Christian-Heritage Societies by Claire Adida, David Laitin and Marie-Anne Valfort (hereafter, ALV), providing an analytical perspective on the issues related to minority discrimination and integration in a host society. Building upon the sociological and recent economic approaches to cultural integration, we highlight the different mechanisms behind the existence of a discriminatory equilibrium between a majority group and a minority group in a given social context. The paper then discusses the specific case of the Muslim minority groups in the French context and outlines the strengths and limitations of the research approach expanded by ALV. We finally consider the policy proposals provided by ALV, assessing their viability, as well as the dynamic political economy constraints they might face in a Christian-heritage society.

We propose a model of intergenerational transmission of education wherein children belong to either highly educated or low-educated families. Children choose the intensity of their social activities, while parents decide how much educational effort to exert. Using Add Health data, we find that, on average, children’s homophily acts as a complement to the educational effort of highly educated parents but as a substitute for the educational effort of low-educated parents. We also find that policies that subsidize kids’ socialization efforts can backfire for low-educated students because they tend to increase their interactions with other low-educated students.

We present a model of technologically interconnected countries that benefit and potentially contribute to advances in the world technology frontier. Greater inequality between successful and unsuccessful entrepreneurs increases entrepreneurial effort and a country’s contribution to that frontier. Under plausible assumptions, the world equilibrium is asymmetric, involving different economic institutions and technology levels for different countries. Some countries become technology leaders and opt for a type of “cutthroat” capitalism with greater inequality and innovations, while others free ride on the cutthroat incentives of the leaders and choose a more “cuddly” form of capitalism with greater social insurance for entrepreneurs.