This paper combines revealed preference and nonparametric estimation techniques to obtain nonparametric bounds on the distribution of the money metric utility and demand functions over a population of heterogeneous households. Our approach is independent of any functional specification on the household utility functions. Our method applies the weak axiom of revealed preference to a population of heterogeneous households. Although this does not produce the sharpest bounds, we show that it is computationally attractive and provides narrow bounds. We demonstrate the usefulness of our results by applying it to the Consumer Expenditure Survey, a U.S. cross–sectional consumption data set.

We develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for household consumption. We define a revealed preference characterization of efficient household consumption when the marriage is stable. We characterize stable marriage with intrahousehold (consumption) transfers but without assuming transferable utility. Our revealed preference characterization generates testable conditions even with a single observation per household and heterogeneous individual preferences across households. The characterization also allows for identifying the intrahousehold decision structure (including the sharing rule) under the same minimalistic assumptions. An application to Dutch household data illustrates the usefulness of our theoretical results.

We present a statistical test for the hypothesis of (approximate) utility maximization on the basis of nonparametric revealed preference conditions. We take as null hypothesis that the consumer behaves randomly, and we reject this hypothesis only if the data provides sufficient evidence to support the alternative hypothesis of approximate utility maximization. Our statistical test uses a permutation method to operationalize the principle of random consumption behavior. We show that our test (i) is valid for any sample size under the null and (ii) has an asymptotic power of one. We also provide simulated power results and two empirical applications.

We introduce a new solution concept for models of coalition formation, called the myopic stable set (MSS). The MSS is defined for a general class of social environments and allows for an infinite state space. An MSS exists and, under minor continuity assumptions, it is also unique. The MSS generalizes and unifies various results from more specific applications. It coincides with the coalition structure core in coalition function form games when this set is nonempty; with the set of stable matchings in the Gale-Shapley matching model; with the set of pairwise stable networks and closed cycles in models of network formation; and with the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in pseudo-potential games and finite supermodular games. We also characterize the MSS for the class of proper simple games.