We provide a new theory of the role of banks as catalysts for industrialization. In their influential analysis of continental European industrialization, Gerschenkron and Schumpeter argued that banks promoted the creation of new industries. We formalize this role of banks by introducing financial intermediaries into a “big push” model. We show that banks may act as catalysts for industrialization provided they are sufficiently large to mobilize a critical mass of firms and that they possess sufficient market power to make profits from coordination. The theory provides simple conditions that help explain why banks seem to play a creative role in some but not in other emerging markets. The model also shows that universal banking helps to reduce the cost of acting as catalyst. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21, N2, O14, O16.

We empirically examine how venture capitalists adjust coinvestor relationships over time. We identify a fundamental trade-off where the benefits of familiarity are weighed against the opportunity costs of coinvesting with other syndication partners. Using US data, we find that venture capitalists dynamically adjust their relationship intensities by gradually disengaging from overly deep relationships. More centrally networked investors are more cautious with disengaging. In hot investment markets investors disengage more readily from existing relationships, but new relationships forged in hot market are less enduring. Perhaps surprisingly, we find a negative relationship between deeper prior relationships and investment performance.

We examine the effect of trust on financial investment and contracting decisions in a micro-economic environment where trust is exogenous. Using hand-collected data on European venture capital, we show that the Eurobarometer measure of trust among nations significantly affects investment decisions. This holds even after controlling for investor and company fixed effects, geographic distance, information and transaction costs. The national identity of venture capital firms' individual partners further contributes to the effect of trust. Education and work experience reduce the effect of trust but do not eliminate it. We also examine the relationship between trust and sophisticated contracts involving contingent control rights and find that, even after controlling for endogeneity, they are complements, not substitutes.