Recently, developing countries have witnessed a sharp increase in foreign bank participation. We examine the impact on banking outreach using newly gathered data for Mexico, where foreign bank participation rose from 2% to 83% of assets during 1997–2005. Country-, bank-, and bank-municipality-level estimations show a decline in the number of deposit and loan accounts. While country- and bank-level estimations indicate an increase in the share of municipalities with bank branches and in the likelihood of bank presence, bank-municipality regressions show that only rich and urban municipalities benefited. Overall, the evidence is consistent with a decline in outreach.

This paper documents large cross-country variation in the relationship between bank competition and bank stability and explores market, regulatory and institutional features that can explain this variation. We show that an increase in competition will have a larger impact on banks’ fragility in countries with stricter activity restrictions, lower systemic fragility, better developed stock exchanges, more generous deposit insurance and more effective systems of credit information sharing. The effects are economically large and thus have important repercussions for the current regulatory reform debate.

We assess the effect of privatization on performance in a panel of Nigerian banks for the period 1990–2001. We find evidence of performance improvement in nine banks that were privatized, which is remarkable given the inhospitable environment for true financial intermediation. Our results also suggest negative effects of the continuing minority government ownership on the performance of many Nigerian banks. Finally, our results complement aggregate indications of decreasing financial intermediation over the 1990s; banks that focused on investment in government bonds and non-lending activities enjoyed a relatively better performance.

Exploiting spatial and time variation, we find that banks geographically more exposed to lockdown measures experience an increase in loss provisions and non-performing loans. Exposures to the pandemic itself have a similar, but slightly weaker effect. We observe an increase in small business lending driven by government-guaranteed loans which seem to replace regular loans. Interestingly, lenders more exposed to lockdown measures rely more on government-guaranteed loans – even when controlling for borrower exposure. Finally, we observe a reduction in the number and average amount of syndicated loans for banks more affected by the pandemic, as well as an increase in interest spreads. These findings point to a negative impact of the pandemic on the supply side of finance, to previously unknown side effects of government support, and to the critical role of banks in channeling government support measures to small firms.

Abstract Using a unique data set for a commercial bank in Albania, we analyze gender differences in loan officers’ performance. Loans screened and monitored by female loan officers have a lower likelihood to turn problematic than loans handled by male loan officers. This effect cannot be explained by borrower or loan officer selection or differences in screening, work load, and experience. However, while the performance gap always exists for female borrowers, female loan officers only gain a performance advantage with male borrowers with experience and do not have an advantage with borrowers that are legal entities. We therefore interpret this as suggestive evidence for female loan officers’ better capacity to build trust relationships with borrowers.

Financial systems all over the world have grown dramatically over recent decades. But is more finance necessarily better? And what concept of financial system – a focus on its size, including both intermediation and other auxiliary “non-intermediation” activities, or a focus on traditional intermediation activity – is relevant for its impact on real sector outcomes? This paper assesses the relationship between the size of the financial system and intermediation, on the one hand, and GDP per capita growth and growth volatility, on the other hand. Based on a sample of 77 countries for the period 1980–2007, we find that intermediation activities increase growth and reduce volatility in the long run. An expansion of the financial sectors along other dimensions has no long-run effect on real sector outcomes. Over shorter time horizons a large financial sector stimulates growth at the cost of higher volatility in high-income countries. Intermediation activities stabilize the economy in the medium run especially in low-income countries. As this is an initial exploration of the link between financial system indicators and growth and volatility, we focus on OLS regressions, leaving issues of endogeneity and omitted variable biases for future research.

Abstract While bank supervisors frequently cooperate across countries, novel data on 268 cooperation agreements reveal that such cooperation falls short of covering the global operations of large banking groups. We show that this causes material regulatory arbitrage: banking groups allocate lending activities and risk into third-country subsidiaries when cooperation agreements cover their operations in other countries. The average distortion in a country’s foreign lending caused by regulatory arbitrage is 21 percent, with the effect being magnified in the presence of a weak supervisory framework. Taken together, our results indicate that incompleteness in cooperation substantially diminishes its global effectiveness.

We examine the effects of cross-border supervisory arbitrage on corporate lending and firm performance. We show that subsidiaries of banking groups improve loan conditions for firms when the group’s opportunities to take risks in other countries are curbed. The expansion in lending is targeted towards firms of higher quality and firms that the group is already familiar with. The improved lending conditions have positive real effects, allowing recipient firms to increase capital spending and leading to higher profits. Taken together, our results suggest that there can be benefits for firms in countries that receive lending inflows due to the supervisory arbitrage.

Abstract This article examines the effectiveness of cooperation among bank supervisors using novel data on supranational agreements signed by 93 countries. Exploiting that globally operating banks are differently covered by these agreements, we show that supervisory cooperation generally improves bank stability. The magnitude of the effect is higher for smaller global banks, and when supervisors are more stringent and have access to higher quality information. We also show that actual supervisory cooperation varies across countries consistent with differences in economic costs and benefits of cooperation. This suggests that cooperation is not always desirable, despite being effective in reducing bank risk.

ABSTRACT Using a unique firm‐level survey database covering 54 countries, we investigate the effect of financial, legal, and corruption problems on firms' growth rates. Whether these factors constrain growth depends on firm size. It is consistently the smallest firms that are most constrained. Financial and institutional development weakens the constraining effects of financial, legal, and corruption obstacles and it is again the small firms that benefit the most. There is only a weak relation between firms' perception of the quality of the courts in their country and firm growth. We also provide evidence that the corruption of bank officials constrains firm growth.