Abstract Launched in Summer 2012, the European Central Bank’s (ECB) Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program indirectly recapitalized European banks through its positive impact on periphery sovereign bonds. However, the stability reestablished in the banking sector did not fully translate into economic growth. We document zombie lending by banks that remained weakly capitalized even post-OMT. In turn, firms receiving loans used these funds not to undertake real economic activity, such as employment and investment, but to build cash reserves. Creditworthy firms in industries with a high zombie firm prevalence significantly suffered from this credit misallocation, which further slowed the economic recovery. Received March 21, 2018; editorial decision November 13, 2018 by Editor Philip Strahan. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

We explore the causes of the credit crunch during the European sovereign debt crisis and its impact on the corporate policies of European firms. Our results show that value impairment in banks’ exposures to sovereign debt and the risk-shifting behavior of weakly capitalized banks reduced the probability of firms being granted new syndicated loans by up to 53%. This lending contraction depressed investment, employment, and sales growth of firms affiliated with affected banks. Our estimates based on firm-level data suggest that the credit crunch explains between 44% and 66% of the overall negative real effects suffered by European firms. Received April 5, 2016; editorial decision February 3, 2018 by Editor Andrew Karolyi. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

ABSTRACT We analyze how regulatory constraints on household leverage—in the form of loan‐to‐income and loan‐to‐value limits—affect residential mortgage credit and house prices as well as other asset classes not directly targeted by the limits. Loan‐level data suggest that mortgage credit is reallocated from low‐ to high‐income borrowers and from urban to rural counties. This reallocation weakens the feedback between credit and house prices and slows house price growth in “hot” housing markets. Banks whose lending to households is more affected by the regulatory constraint drive this reallocation, but also substitute their risk‐taking into holdings of securities and corporate credit.

ABSTRACT We show that “zombie credit”—subsidized credit to nonviable firms—has a disinflationary effect. By keeping these firms afloat, zombie credit creates excess aggregate supply, thereby putting downward pressure on prices. Granular European data on inflation, firms, and banks confirm this mechanism. Markets affected by a rise in zombie credit experience lower firm entry and exit, capacity utilization, markups, and inflation, as well as a misallocation of capital and labor, which results in lower productivity, investment, and value added. If weakly capitalized banks were recapitalized in 2009, inflation in Europe would have been up to 0.21 percentage points higher post‐2012.