We study the role of analysts and options traders in the information transmission between options and stock markets. We first show that the predictive power of option implied volatilities (IVs) on stock returns more than doubles around analyst-related events, indicating that a significant proportion of the options predictability on stock returns comes from informed options traders’ information about upcoming analyst-related news. We examine three explanations for this finding: tipping, reverse tipping and common information. We find that analyst tipping to options traders is the most consistent explanation of these predictive patterns.

A specific day-trading policy in Taiwan futures market allows an investigation of the performance of day traders. Since October 2007, investors who characterize themselves as “day traders” by closing their day-trade positions on the same day enjoy a 50% reduction in the initial margin. Because we can identify day traders ex ante, we have a laboratory to explore trading behavior without the contamination of potential behavioral biases. Our results show that the 3470 individual day traders in the sample incur on average a significant loss of 61,500 (26,700) New Taiwan dollars after (before) transaction costs over October 2007–September 2008. This implies that day traders are not only overconfident about the accuracy of their information but also biased in their interpretations of information. We also find that excessive trading is hazardous only to the overconfident losers, but not to the winners. Last, we provide evidence that more experienced individual investors exhibit more aggressive day trading behavior, although they do not learn their types or gain superior trading skills that could mitigate their losses.

We document a novel pattern that campaign goal amounts set by entrepreneurs on Kickstarter exhibit clear clustering at round numbers. We propose that the round number heuristic, a tendency to adopt round numbers as cognitive shortcuts when facing complicated and uncertain situations, may explain the clustering pattern and predict campaign outcomes. Based on 162,863 campaigns between 2009 and 2017, we find a negative relation between the use of round goal amounts and the likelihood of campaign success. Our findings suggest that setting a round number goal conveys useful information about entrepreneur quality that could be used by campaign backers or platforms.

Stock returns during the week are negatively associated with the reported incidence of domestic violence during the weekend. This relationship is primarily driven by negative returns. The incidence of domestic violence increases with the magnitude of losses, and the effect increases with local stock market participation. Our findings suggest that negative wealth shocks caused by stock market crashes can affect stress levels within intimate relationships, escalate arguments, and trigger domestic violence. Stock market losses may reduce household utility beyond the shock to financial wealth, supporting gain-loss models where disutility from losses outweighs the utility from gains of a similar magnitude. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

We study the role of regional cultural differences in M&A transactions in the U.S. A larger social trust distance between two companies reduces the likelihood of them combining via an M&A transaction and results in lower completion rates and longer completion times, indicating higher complexity in deal execution. However, a larger social trust distance is also associated with higher gains from mergers, as measured by acquirer and combined announcement returns and medium-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns. This suggests that for these announced deals, the synergy potential is high enough to offset the costs induced by the large cultural distance.

We find that analysts are more likely to downgrade stocks when prices approach the 52-week high. The results are stronger for stocks with higher information asymmetry but moderated by analysts' reputation, work experience, and educational background. We also find a strategy that shorts stocks with recommendation downgrades is less profitable for the downgrades near 52-week high than for other downgrades. Moreover, these downgraded firms with prices near 52-week high subsequently experience relatively less negative earnings forecast revisions. These results suggest that these downgrade decisions are less likely to be information-driven and consistent with our anchoring interpretation.

We provide a new perspective on option and stock price behavior around 52-week highs and lows. We analyze whether option-implied volatilities (IVs) change when stock prices approach or break through their 52-week high or low. We also study the effects of highs and lows on a stock’s beta and return volatility. We find that IVs and stock betas decrease when approaching a high or low, and that volatilities increase after breakthroughs. The effects are economically large and significant. The approach results can be explained by the anchoring theory. The breakthrough results are consistent with anchoring and the investor attention hypothesis.

This paper explores whether firms manage their earnings after stock splits to meet the raised expectations from the market due to the positive signal sent by the splits. We first document that post-split drift mainly exists in the first three months and is positively associated with post-split standardized unexpected earnings (SUE). However, the higher post-split SUE of split firms is associated with higher discretionary accruals and abnormally lower R&D expenses. This result is consistent with our hypothesis that split firms overstate their post-split earnings by manipulating accruals and reducing R&D spending. Moreover, post-split abnormal returns increase with discretionary accruals and R&D reduction for about six months and tend to reverse over longer horizons, especially for firms with negative pre-split SUE. Overall, our results indicate that the post-split drift is a short-term phenomenon and partly attributable to the earnings management after the splits.

We propose that firms use stock splits as a means of attracting attention and inducing information production to correct price distortion caused by investors’ 52-week high anchoring bias. Our analysis shows that firms are more likely to split stocks when their prices are near 52-week highs, especially if they are highly profitable and undervalued. After splits, undervaluation gradually disappears. Moreover, these splits are associated with a slower market reaction and a more positive post-split drift, consistent with the notion that investors’ anchoring bias hinders price adjustment, leading to a gradual price correction. In addition, the likelihood of such splits increases with CEO wealth-performance sensitivity, and investment-price sensitivity increases following splits. Our evidence suggests that firms utilize stock splits to correct mispricing induced by investors’ 52-week high anchoring bias.

This article provides the first comprehensive evidence that the return extrapolation behavior of investors leads to biases in the expectations of volatility. Lower past returns are associated with higher expectations of volatility when using the physical, risk-neutral, and survey measures to estimate volatility expectations. Consistent with the return extrapolation framework, recent past returns have a larger impact than distant past returns on volatility expectations. Biases in volatility expectations are i) distinct from extrapolating past realized volatility, ii) asymmetrically induced by recent past negative returns, and iii) lead investors to pay more to insure against the perceived higher expected volatility.