This paper investigates the capital and portfolio risk decisions of property-liability insurance firms. A theoretical model based on option pricing theory is developed which predicts a positive relationship between insurer capital and risk, as firms balance these two factors to achieve their desired overall insolvency risk. The implications of the model are then tested empirically using a simultaneous equations methodology. The results support the predictions of the model. They also provide evidence that managerial incentives play a role in determining capital and risk in insurance markets. The findings have significant implications for insurance solvency regulation.

We examine the accounting and market performance of reverse leveraged buyouts (i.e., firms making their first public offering after previously completing a leveraged buyout). On average, the accounting performance of these firms is significantly better than their industries at the time of the initial public offering (IPO) and for at least the following four years, though there is some evidence of a decline in performance. Cross-sectional variation in accounting performance subsequent to the IPO is related to changes in the equity ownership of both operating management and other insiders, and is unrelated to changes in leverage. Finally, there is no evidence of abnormal common stock performance after the reverse leveraged buyout.

We study the implied volatility behavior of call options around scheduled news announcement days. Implied volatilities increase significantly during the pre-event period and reach a maximum on the eve of the news announcement. After the news release, implied volatility drops sharply and gradually moves back to its long-run level. Only on the event date are movements in the price of the underlying significantly larger than expected. These results confirm the theoretical results of Merton (1973).

ABSTRACT This article examines a model in which decisions are made at fixed intervals and are unsynchronized across agents. Agents choose nondurable consumption and portfolio composition, and either or both can be chosen infrequently. A small utility cost is associated with both decisions being made infrequently. Calibrating returns to the U.S. economy, less frequent and unsynchronized decision‐making delivers the low volatility of aggregate consumption growth and its low correlation with equity return found in U.S. data. Allowing portfolio rebalancing to occur every period has a negligible impact on the joint behavior of aggregate consumption and returns.

This study presents an integrated investigation into the factors affecting executive ownership, the market value of the firm, and executive compensation by explicitly incorporating the simultaneity of the process determining these variables into the empirical estimation. Overall, the results of the study support the notion that a firm's market value, executive stock ownership, and executive compensation are jointly determined. Further, the findings suggest that executive stock ownership and executive compensation may serve as a type of bond by which top executives are induced to act in the best interests of shareholders. The study also finds that a firm's q ratio and an executive's job-specific experience (as well as firm size) are important determinants of executive compensation. This result is generally consistent with the view that the firm optimally establishes its managerial compensation plan in response to both its operating environment and the specific personal characteristics of its chief executive(s).