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Secret Reservation Prices in Bookbuilding

Review of Finance 2007 11(4), 693-718 open access
Why is the issuer's reservation price not disclosed in bookbuilding? We analyze the differential effect of reservation price disclosure on the underpricing required to elicit truthful indications of interest from investors. We find that a policy of disclosure would increase proceeds for firms with a reservation price sufficiently high relative to possible investor valuations of the shares, but would decrease proceeds for issuers with lower reservation prices. The former group is likely to be absent from the IPO market, explaining why secrecy in reservation prices is the norm.

Price stabilization as a bonding mechanism in new equity issues

Journal of Financial Economics 1996 42(2), 223-255 open access
Underwriters have an incentive to overstate investor interest in order to persuade some investors to purchase shares at a price in excess of their initial estimate of the fair value. We show that this incentive is eliminated when the underwriter commits to secondary market price stabilization. Destroying the underwriter's incentive to overstate interest reduces the total surplus captured by initial investors in initial public offerings. Further efficiency gains are associated with penalty bid systems that permit the underwriter to make the stabilization commitment selectively. Price stabilization can thus be viewed as a bonding mechanism that improves the efficiency of the primary equity market.

The dark side of cross-listing: A new perspective from China

Journal of Banking & Finance 2015 57, 1-16 open access
The overwhelming majority of Chinese firms that list their stock both in China and abroad had gone public, and listed, abroad first. We find that when companies listed abroad return to China to issue stock and list, they experience poorer post-issuance stock and operating performance in comparison to purely domestic issuers. Also, they raise more funds relative to their sales, leave less money on the table for investors, and incur lower direct flotation costs. Among returning firms, those which raise higher proceeds relative to sales experience poorer long-run stock performance and lower Tobin’s q post issuance. Our results offer a new perspective on cross-listing, which we term ‘dressing-up-for-premium’. Firms from less-developed markets take advantage of the enhanced visibility and prestige associated with the foreign listing to issue shares domestically at inflated prices and favorable terms, and to raise greater proceeds than they can efficiently use.