The paper seeks to enhance our understanding of the interaction between the development of disciplinary power in western liberal society and Foucault's writings on governmentality, through examination of the political processes resulting from the largest public scandal in the UK, the Poulson scandal of the early 1970s. The first research motive is to uncover any additional insights or hidden understandings that can be derived by applying Foucauldian historiographical and governmental perspectives as strengthened by Dean's (2010) analytics of government to the history of corporate governance in English local authorities over the forty years following Poulson. We argue that the continual process of intervention, investigation and prescription by central government set in motion by the scandal resulted in an increase in disciplinary power within local government by changing the expectations of council officials, elected representatives and politicians in Westminster through the normalisation of these intrusions and the spirit of dependency and compliance which resulted. Secondly, the paper examines the strengths and weaknesses of the analytics approach in a complex situation involving many genealogical disruptions to the status quo over a long time-period; and whilst the paper found the method helpful, limitations emerged regarding its claims to empirical certainty through precise questioning. Finally, the paper examines the significance of countering corruption as a motivating factor in the rise of disciplinary power in English local government, which it finds as limited.

This paper examines and compares the performance and operating behavior of demutualized building societies (DBS) over the period of 1987–2007 relative to mutual building societies and major retail banks in the UK. We find significant differences in their operating behavior over this period and show that the operating behavior varies with the form of ownership. We also investigate the potential causes of the failure of all DBS in the UK. Our findings show significant changes in the funding and lending strategies of DBS which expose them to higher risk. We also find a strained capital formation and deteriorating capital base of DBS in the post-conversion period. Our results suggest that changes in the business model, diminished capital base and, in part, failing to get all the necessary funding from the wholesale market at the time of the financial crisis of 2007–08 contributed to the demise of a once a successful financial institution in the UK.