By examining the ethnic identity of authors in over 2.5 million scientific papers written by US-based authors from 1985 to 2008, we find that persons of similar ethnicity coauthor together more frequently than predicted by their proportion among authors. The greater homophily is associated with publication in lower-impact journals and with fewer citations. Meanwhile, papers with authors in more locations and with longer reference lists get published in higher-impact journals and receive more citations. These findings suggest that diversity in inputs by author ethnicity, location, and references leads to greater contributions to science as measured by impact factors and citations.

Using data on China's split-share structure reform that floats non-tradable shares, we find that Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs) have greater influence over the controlling state shareholders than local mutual funds. QFIIs are less prone to political pressure and are more likely to participate in arm's-length negotiation and monitoring in state-controlled companies. The presence of QFII ownership shortens the duration of the reform and increases the compensation to minority tradable shareholders. Unlike local mutual funds, the positive relationship between state ownership and the compensation to tradable shareholders increases with the presence of QFII ownership. Furthermore, QFIIs increase the likelihood of revision in reform proposals among state-controlled companies. Domestic mutual funds seem to make earnest negotiations in non-state-controlled companies in the absence of political pressure. Evidence suggests that involving foreign institutional investors in corporate governance practices can significantly reduce expropriation by controlling shareholders in emerging markets.

To the extent that investors diversify internationally, large-cap stocks receive the dominant share of fund allocation. Increasingly, however, returns to large-cap stocks or stock market indices tend to comove, mitigating the benefits from international diversification. In contrast, stocks of locally oriented, small companies do not exhibit the same tendency. In this paper, we assess the potential of small-cap stocks as a vehicle for international portfolio diversification during the period 1980–1999. We show that the extra gains from the augmented diversification with small-cap funds are statistically significant for both in-sample and out-of-sample periods and remain robust to the consideration of market frictions.

When companies select and use compensation peers to determine chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, they create unintended peer effects on corporate innovation due to the similarities between these companies and their compensation peers in terms of product markets, CEO characteristics, and compensation schemes. After controlling for industry and geography peer groups, the findings confirm that the average innovation activity of compensation peers is a significant and distinct predictor of corporate innovation. Further analysis showed that (1) the peer effect is stronger in firms and compensation peers that pay their CEOs using long-term compensation, in firms with stronger labor market competition and board monitoring, and in peer companies that experience higher innovation competition and are closer to the median peer company in the peer group; (2) the obtained results are likely not attributable to the knowledge spillover mechanism and are more consistent with the peer pressure mechanism; and (3) the Securities and Exchange Commission's 2006 executive compensation disclosure rules may have generated peer effects.