This paper uses earnings announcements to analyze the trading behavior and associated price impacts of institutions that have a lending or underwriting relationship with client firms and also hold client firms' shares. Buying support from relationship institutions mitigates the negative impact of earnings surprises on client firms' stock prices, predicts subsequent negative earnings surprises, and is also associated with less selling by independent institutions holding the same firms' shares. Price reactions for firms without relationship institutions are significantly larger. Price support from relationship institutions appears to help resolve uncertainty accompanying clients' temporary earnings shocks, thus reducing noise in the capital markets.

This paper examines the relation between managerial power and compensation for Chief Executive Officers of S&P 500 companies from 1993 through 2012. We find that more-powerful CEOs earn more than less-powerful CEOs. We refer to this additional compensation as a “power premium” and investigate this power premium based on two competing views. The managerial ability view argues that the power premium compensates CEOs for their better managerial talent while the managerial power view argues that the power premium reflects the CEO's ability to extract excessive compensation. Overall, our results are more consistent with the managerial ability view. Empirically, we find that the power premium and the fraction of equity-based compensation are invariant to whether the CEO is newly hired or not. We also find that the likelihood of having an explicit employment contract is similar between new and incumbent CEOs.

We employ a difference-in-differences estimation approach to examine the impact of stakeholder orientation on corporate payout policy. The empirical test exploits the enactment of US state-level constituency statutes, which allow directors to consider stakeholders and long-term interests in corporate decision making. We find that firms incorporated in states that have adopted constituency statutes significantly reduce share repurchases, whereas the effects of statute enactment on total payout and dividend payments are marginal and insignificant, respectively. We further show that the negative statute effect on share repurchases is more pronounced for firms that are in financial distress or are close to default, and firms in consumer-focused and high-polluting industries. Overall, our findings indicate that promoting stakeholder orientation can have a significant impact on corporate payout decisions.

We examine how firms' dividend policy affects the initial compensation of their newly appointed CEOs. We focus on newly appointed CEOs to isolate the effect of dividends on compensation and to provide new insights into an aspect largely neglected by compensation research. We show that the dividend payout is positively related to new CEO compensation. Further, the positive effect of dividends is stronger for firms with no dividend cuts over the past two, three and four years, firms with relatively high institutional ownership, and those with strong boards, consistent with new CEOs receiving higher pay as compensation for greater dividend pressure.

Using the staggered enactment of constituency statutes across US states, we find that banks with directors whose legal duties are expanded to consider stakeholder and long-term interests significantly reduce risk-taking by increasing capital and shifting to safer borrowers. Additionally, we find that the effect of statute enactment on bank performance is insignificant on average but significantly positive for banks that take excessive risk. Furthermore, we find that banks that previously received a statute enactment fared significantly better during the crises. Our findings support the increasing calls for greater emphasis on stakeholder interests amidst the current bank regulatory and governance reforms.

We investigate the takeover strategies of high default risk acquirers and their value impact. We find that these bidders select bigger, less profitable and unrelated targets, pursue transactions during recessions, and pay with shares by offering target shareholders high premiums. Their long-term buy-and-hold returns are extremely negative, and reflect fundamentally their substantial drop in profitability combined with high leverage. We show that the well-established long-run underperformance of acquiring firms is largely driven by this sub-set of acquirers. The results are similar when we use alternative measures of default risk and performance, and a global sample of non-US bidders.

This paper studies how hedge fund activism impacts corporate innovation. Firms targeted by activists improve their innovation efficiency over the five-year period following hedge fund intervention. Despite a tightening in research and development (R&D) expenditures, target firms increase innovation output, as measured by both patent counts and citations, with stronger effects among firms with more diversified innovation portfolios. Reallocation of innovative resources, redeployment of human capital, and change to board-level expertise all contribute to improve target firms’ innovation. Additional tests help isolate the effect of intervention from alternative explanations, including mean reversion, sample attrition, voluntary reforms, or activist stock-picking.

We find that fund managers who began their careers during recessions produce superior returns. This superior performance is not unconditional, as they exhibit better market timing than their non-recession counterparts in recessions, but do not demonstrate better stock picking in booms. Exploring managers' portfolio choices across years, we find that recession managers tilt their investments towards defensive, rather than cyclical, industries during and before recession periods. Overall, our findings support the argument that the economic conditions under which an individual initially entered the labour market exert a long-term impact on her career outcomes and decision-making.

Does a decrease in shareholder litigation enhance managers’ monitoring efforts by ensuring adequate firm risk management? We explore how state universal demand (UD) laws (which limit shareholder litigation as a mechanism to discipline managers), affect bank holding companies’ (BHCs) risk. Using a difference-in-differences analysis, we show that BHCs reduce their tail risk exposures after the implementation of UD laws, which is achieved by improving loan asset quality. Indeed, BHCs appear to apply stricter contract terms for syndicate loans to risky and opaque borrowers. We also show that UD law implementation leads to changes in BHC board composition by increasing the proportion of outside directors, the number of independent directors in audit committees and the number of independent directors with financial expertise.

We study whether borrowers' opaque practices, such as tax aggressiveness, are affected by their lenders' engagement in mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Our findings suggest that borrowers' tax aggressiveness is negatively associated with bank mergers as banks increasingly rely on hard information in monitoring and lending practices following mergers. This relationship is more pronounced for borrowers that are more opaque in their information environments and have a greater need for credit, and when banks that have a greater intention to monitor borrowers and rely more on soft-information-based monitoring prior to the mergers. Our study contributes to the growing literature on whether and how bank consolidations affect borrowers' decision making.