The success of behavioral economics has led to a new challenge: many biases offer observationally similar predictions for a targeted financial anomaly. To tame this bias zoo, we combine subjective survey responses with observational data to propose a new approach, one that is robust to question-specific biases introduced through surveys. We illustrate this approach by administering a nationwide survey of Chinese retail investors to elicit their trading motives. In cross-sectional regressions of respondents’ actual turnover on survey-based trading motives, perceived information advantage and gambling preference dominate other motives, though they are not the most prevalent biases based on survey responses.

This paper presents a dynamic equilibrium model of bond markets in which two groups of agents hold heterogeneous expectations about future economic conditions. The heterogeneous expectations cause agents to take on speculative positions against each other and therefore generate endogenous relative wealth fluctuation. The relative wealth fluctuation amplifies asset price volatility and contributes to the time variation in bond premia. Our model shows that a modest amount of heterogeneous expectations can help explain several puzzling phenomena, including the “excessive volatility” of bond yields, the failure of the expectations hypothesis, and the ability of a tent-shaped linear combination of forward rates to predict bond returns.

By analyzing 20 developed economies over 1920–2012, we find the following evidence of overoptimism and neglect of crash risk by bank equity investors during credit expansions: (i) bank credit expansion predicts increased bank equity crash risk, but despite the elevated crash risk, also predicts lower mean bank equity returns in subsequent one to three years; (ii) conditional on bank credit expansion of a country exceeding a 95th percentile threshold, the predicted excess return for the bank equity index in subsequent three years is −37.3%; and (iii) bank credit expansion is distinct from equity market sentiment captured by dividend yield and yet dividend yield and credit expansion interact with each other to make credit expansion a particularly strong predictor of lower bank equity returns when dividend yield is low.

We develop a model of asset price bubbles based on the communication process between advisors and investors. Advisors are well-intentioned and want to maximize the welfare of their advisees (like a parent treats a child). But only some advisors understand the new technology (the tech-savvies); others do not and can only make a downward-biased recommendation (the old-fogies). While smart investors recognize the heterogeneity in advisors, naive ones mistakenly take whatever is said at face value. Tech-savvies inflate their forecasts to signal that they are not old-fogies, since more accurate information about their type improves the welfare of investors in the future. A bubble arises for a wide range of parameters, and its size is maximized when there is a mix of smart and naive investors in the economy. Our model suggests an alternative source for stock over-valuation in addition to investor overreaction to news and sell-side bias.

We examine historical banking crises through the lens of bank equity declines, which cover a broad sample of episodes of banking distress with and without banking panics. To do this, we construct a new data set on bank equity returns and narrative information on banking panics for 46 countries over the period of 1870 to 2016. We find that even in the absence of panics, large bank equity declines are associated with substantial credit contractions and output gaps. Although panics are an important amplification mechanism, our results indicate that panics are not necessary for banking crises to have severe economic consequences. Furthermore, panics tend to be preceded by large bank equity declines, suggesting that panics are the result, rather than the cause, of earlier bank losses. We use bank equity returns to uncover a number of forgotten historical banking crises and create a banking crisis chronology that distinguishes between bank equity losses and panics.

This article proposes a welfare criterion for economies in which agents have heterogeneously distorted beliefs. Instead of taking a stand on whose belief is correct, our criterion asserts that an allocation is belief-neutral efficient (inefficient) if it is efficient (inefficient) under any convex combination of agents’ beliefs. Although this criterion gives an incomplete ranking of social allocations, it can identify positive- and negative-sum speculation driven by conflicting beliefs in a broad range of economic environments.

We model the relationship between asset float (tradeable shares) and speculative bubbles. Investors with heterogeneous beliefs and short‐sales constraints trade a stock with limited float because of insider lockups. A bubble arises as price overweighs optimists' beliefs and investors anticipate the option to resell to those with even higher valuations. The bubble's size depends on float as investors anticipate an increase in float with lockup expirations and speculate over the degree of insider selling. Consistent with the internet experience, the bubble, turnover, and volatility decrease with float and prices drop on the lockup expiration date.

We document issuance overpricing of corporate debt securities in China, which is robust across subsamples with different credit ratings, maturities, and issuers. This phenomenon contrasts with underpricing of equity and debt securities in Western countries and reflects China's distinct institutional environment. The average overpricing dropped from 7.44 basis points to 2.41 basis points after the government prohibited underwriters from using rebates in issuances in October 2017. By analyzing overpricing before and after the rebate ban and across different issuers and underwriters, we uncover two channels for underwriters, who compete for future underwriting business, to drive up overpricing: rebates and self-purchases.

By exploiting variation in state capital gains taxation as an instrument, we analyze the economic consequences of housing speculation during the U.S. housing boom in the 2000s. We find that housing speculation, anchored, in part, on extrapolation of past housing price changes, led not only to greater price appreciation, economic expansions, and housing construction during the boom in 2004–2006 but also to more severe economic downturns during the subsequent bust in 2007–2009. Our analysis supports supply overhang and local household demand as two key channels for transmitting these adverse effects.