The price-earnings relation can be characterized as a system of simultaneous equations. Earnings and prices can behave as if they are both endogenously determined because they are jointly affected by information that is difficult to specify explicitly. Specification tests provide evidence that both earnings changes and price changes are endogenous. The price and earnings coefficients increase from OLS to joint estimation and, under a restrictive set of assumptions, provide increasingly similar estimates of the permanent component of earnings. The evidence is consistent with the contention that a portion of the single-equation bias can be mitigated via joint estimation.

William H. Beaver, Stephen G. Ryan, Biases and Lags in Book Value and Their Effects on the Ability of the Book-to-Market Ratio to Predict Book Return on Equity, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Spring, 2000), pp. 127-148

This study tests predictions that pricing multiples on and incremental explanatory power of equity book value (net income) increase (decrease) as financial health decreases. Tests using a sample of 396 bankrupt firms and tests using a larger, pooled sample both yield inferences consistent with predictions. Findings are robust to inclusion of controls for industry, size, return-on-equity, and volatility of equity returns. Equity book value and net income multiples and incremental explanatory power vary predictably across three illustrative industries, selected based on the likely extent of unrecognized intangible assets.

We examine bankruptcy within business groups. Groups have incentives to support financially distressed subsidiaries, as the bankruptcy of a subsidiary may impose severe costs on the group as a whole. This is in part because, in several countries, bankruptcy courts often “pierce the corporate veil” and hold groups liable for their distressed subsidiaries’ obligations as if they were their own. Using a large cross-country sample of group-affiliated firms, we show that, by reallocating resources within the corporate structure, business groups actively manage intra-group credit risk to prevent costly within-group insolvencies. Moreover, we document that recent regulatory changes in the approval and disclosure of related party transactions are costly for business groups in that they constrain their ability to shield their subsidiaries from credit-risk shocks. Our study informs the current regulatory debate on related party transactions by highlighting an important cost of anti-self-dealing regulation.